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Rethinking Constitutional Interpretation to 
Affirm Human Rights and Dignity  
by VINCENT J. SAMAR* 
Introduction 
This article will show that debates over the two most common 
approaches to constitutional interpretation, Originalism and living 
constitution, are both theoretically and practically open to challenges from 
those who believe either approach is undemocratic or provides insufficient 
protection for minority rights.  Given these challenges, a new approach is 
needed: one that provides constitutional viability in the present age without 
opening the Constitution to any fad of interpretation.  The Supreme Court 
needs to have available a method of interpretation that is respectful of the 
past without being tied to it, so as to meet current challenges to our evolving 
understanding of human rights.   
Constitutional interpretation proceeds on the assumption that the 
Constitution remains binding law.  That assumption, I will argue, requires 
privileging human rights if most Americans are to continue to find 
legitimacy in the Constitution’s status as higher law.  Current theories of 
constitutional interpretation have either largely failed to account for the 
document’s continued, cross-generational legitimacy or have widened 
interpretation as to effectively nullify any work the document might perform.  
Originalism, for example, interprets the Constitution in an attempt to affirm 
what the Framers would have most likely expected to be the consequences 
of their writings.  Few Supreme Court decisions utilize this approach, and it 
is almost entirely nonresponsive to changes in social and economic 
conditions during the last century.  The living Constitution approach follows 
a common law-like approach, which means the Court may merely appeal to 
custom or precedent to create constitutional change, effectively adjusting the 
 
 *  Vincent J. Samar is a Lecturer in Philosophy and an Associate Faculty Member at Loyola 
University Chicago Graduate School, and an Adjunct Professor of Law at Loyola University 
Chicago School of Law.  The author would like to express his thanks to Professor Mark Strasser of 
Capital University Law School for his comments on an earlier version of this article. 
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language to resolve current issues, even if the adjustment results in distortion 
of the language.  Arguably, by using this method of interpretation, the Court 
fails to ascribe any significance to the document’s actual language or original 
purposes.  In the view to be expressed here, tradition continues to play a role, 
but not-so-rigidly as to disavow new ways of reconstructing past 
determinations so as to legitimately respond to important social and cultural 
needs.  Human rights serve as the glue for binding the different 
interpretations together under a higher-ordered set of values, whether by 
adoption of amendments or Court interpretations.  Since a philosophical 
grounding for human rights can be found in our common understanding of 
human freedom and well-being, it stands to reason that this foundation, along 
with its criteria for resolving conflicts of rights, is a viable way to avoid the 
most obvious difficulties with the current theories.   
It should be noted that my approach is both systematic and narrowly-
focused.  First, it is systematic because it searches for the common thread 
between the preferred interpretation of the Constitution and why most 
Americans continue to find this interpretation to be legitimate.  Second, my 
approach is narrowly-focused because it is designed to set forth a method of 
constitutional interpretation that is neither limited to only past intentions nor 
so open-ended as to support virtually any fashionable, value-laden trend.  
Protecting indispensable human rights will sustain the centrality of the 
document to the American experiment.   
Section 1 will review the varied, specific modalities the Supreme Court 
has adopted over the past two-and-one-quarter centuries of interpreting the 
Constitution to meet changing conditions.  Section 2 explores the 
shortcomings of the two most prevalent background normative theories of 
interpretation–Originalism and living Constitution–that have animated 
Supreme Court opinions, but do not provide a clear moral direction for future 
interpretations.  Section 3 discusses how the theory of the social contract, 
when developed into a tradition capable of framing duties incumbent on 
future generations, might explain the Constitution’s legitimacy today.  
Section 4 notes how the Court, at times through its decisions, aided the 
Constitution’s continued legitimacy by gingerly navigating between 
opposing concerns for continuity and for change, which inevitably arise 
when tradition must govern the present.  Together, Sections 3 and 4 establish 
the need for an approach to constitutional interpretation that is dynamic 
enough to meet changing conditions, yet sober enough to recognize past 
contributions.  Section 5 identifies human rights as deriving from two 
sources: (1) some rights originate from the Framers’ beliefs at the time of the 
creation of the Constitution and its subsequent amendments, and (2) other 
rights are those recognized today as human rights by many nations, including 
the United States.  Section 6 follows by addressing concerns about 
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indeterminacy entering constitutional interpretation when new values are 
added on to those rights already recognized.  Section 7 provides the antidote 
to indeterminacy by requiring all human rights to be founded upon voluntary, 
purposive human action; this will avoid transactional inconsistencies when 
applied; and should support the long-term well-being of all persons.  Finally, 
Section 8 completes the work of this Article by showing how the proposed 
change to constitutional interpretation affirms human dignity, which the 
Supreme Court has previously acknowledged as an important constitutional 
value.  A brief conclusion then follows. 
I.  Modalities Recognized by the Supreme Court for Interpreting 
the United States Constitution 
In 1991, Phillip Bobbitt identified six modalities that the Supreme Court 
recognized for interpreting the United States Constitution.1  By a “modality,” 
Bobbitt meant a “way in which we characterize a form of expression as 
true.”2  The Supreme Court uses modalities to justify its interpretations of 
the Constitution.   
Modalities are important because they set out the true conditions for an 
interpretative proposition.  For example, Bobbitt notes that “[a] historical 
modality may be attributed to constitutional arguments that claim that the 
[F]ramers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended, or did not 
intend, or that it cannot be ascertained whether it was their intention, to 
protect pregnant women from state’s coercion . . . to bear children.”3  In Roe 
v. Wade, for example, Justice Blackmun, writing for the Majority, expressed 
concern that the various uses of the word person in the United States Bill of 
Rights did not indicate a postnatal being from which he concluded that “[a]ll 
this, together with our observation . . . that throughout the major portion of 
the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they 
 
 1.  PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) (the modalities are 
historical, textual, structural, prudential, doctrinal, and ethical). 
 2.  Id. at 11.  For example, Bobbitt notes a logical modality, is “attributed to the proposition, 
p, by saying that it is logically necessary or contingent or logically impossible, that ‘p.’”  Id.  In 
other words, there are certain conditions for determining where a statement is true: either it is true 
tautologically by virtue of what it says (like “there are or are not 5 people in the room”) or it is true 
contingently from facts we discover (“Mary wore a turtleneck to work today”), or it is not possible 
to be true as in the case of a contradiction (“it is and is not raining here now”).  Bobbitt notes how 
“knowledge engages the force of logic” when “an epistemic mode” is employed “[t]o say that it is 
known or unknown or known that it is not true that ‘p[.]’”  Id.  This contrasts with saying that p, 
“is obligatory, permissible or forbidden,” which is to signal “a moral or deontic mode” or to say 
that p “is now or will be” . . . . “[a]temporal modality.” 
 3.  Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
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are today, persuades us that the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, does not include the unborn.”4 
Bobbitt identifies the historical modality used, for example, by Justice 
Roger B. Taney in the Dred Scott case, as an “originalist position.”5  An 
Originalist position considers what the Framers intended to convey and 
potentially what they anticipated would be the result of their conveyance 
when they wrote the Constitution and its subsequent amendments.  It thus 
draws on the historical mode in that its focus is on intent that must be proved 
by use of historical sources.  An example of this, cited by Bobbitt, is found 
in Justice Taney’s now infamous Majority Opinion in the Dred Scott case.6  
Taney wrote, in determining whether Article III’s diversity jurisdiction 
extends to former slaves: 
 
It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine who were the 
citizens of the several [s]tates when the Constitution was adopted.  
And in order to do this, we must recur to the [g]overnments and 
institutions of the thirteen colonies . . . .  We must inquire who, at 
that time, were recogni[z]ed as the people or citizens of a [s]tate, 
whose rights and liberties had been outraged by the English 
government; and who declared their independence and assumed 
the powers of [g]overnment to defend their rights by force of arms 
. . . .  We refer to these historical facts for the purpose of showing 
the fixed opinions concerning that race, upon which the statesmen 
of that day spoke and acted.7   
 
Obviously, the use of the historical modality, prior to the adoption of the 
post-Civil War Reconstruction amendments, would likely operate, as it did 
in Taney’s Opinion, to reaffirm the lack of citizenship rights of African-
Americans.  I will return to discussing these human rights concerns in 
Section 7.   
The second modality is a textual modality.8  Bobbitt writes, “[a] textual 
modality may be attributed to arguments that the text of the Constitution 
would, to the average person, appear to declare, or deny, or be too vague to 
say whether, [for example,] a suit between a black American citizen resident 
in a state and a white American citizen resident in another state, is a 
 
 4.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). 
 5.  BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 13. 
 6.  Id. at 13 citing 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856). 
 7. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407, 409 (1856). 
 8.  BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 14. 
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‘controversy between citizens of different states.’”9  Noting the difference 
between a contemporary meaning of these words and the meaning Justice 
Taney ascribed, “[o]ne should not be tempted to conclude, however, that 
textual approaches are inevitably more progressive than originalist 
approaches[;]” indeed, a textual approach “can be a straitjacket, confining 
the judge to language that would have been different if its drafters had 
foreseen later events.”10  Consider Justice William H. Taft’s concern in a 
wiretapping case, allegedly involving a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]”11  Justice Taft wrote: 
 
The [a]mendment itself shows that the search is to be of material 
things—the person, the house, his papers or his effects . . . .  The 
[a]mendment does not forbid what was done here. . . .  There was 
no seizure.  The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of 
hearing and that only.  There was no entry of the houses . . . .  The 
language of the [a]mendment [cannot] be extended and expanded 
. . . .12 
 
Would the Framers have truly intended to exclude listening in on a private 
conversation if they could have foreseen how technological advances would 
make this an effective tool for law enforcement?  When considering a 
textualist approach, this should be a guiding question.   
Bobbitt’s third modality, structural modality, arises in a context that 
turns out [with only slight changes to include electronic emails] to be very 
contemporary: “can a court issue a subpoena (or should it enjoin some other 
subpoena) for the disclosure of the President’s working notes and diaries?”13  
He notes, “[t]o say that the institutional relationships promulgated by the 
Constitution require, or are incompatible with, or tolerate a particular answer 
to this question is to use a structural mode of argument.”14  As an example, 
Bobbitt cites “McCulloch v. Maryland, . . . [which] relies almost wholly on 
structural approaches . . . [i]n determining whether a Maryland tax on the 
Federal Bank of the United States could be enforced[.]’”15  Bobbitt notes that 
“Chief Justice Marshall studiedly refuses to specify the particular text that 
 
 9.  BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 14 (emphasis added).   
 10.  Id. 
 11.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 12.  Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 464-65 (1928). 
 13.  BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 14. 
 14.  Id. at 14-15. 
 15.  Id. at 15 (citing McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316, 317-26 (1819)). 
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supports his argument, and explicitly rejects reliance on historical 
arguments, preferring instead to state the rationale on inferences for the 
structure of federalism.”16  Because structural arguments are less intuitive 
than arguments based on text or history, Bobbitt notes that: 
 
Usually, arguments in this modality are straightforward: first, an 
uncontroversial statement about a constitutional structure is 
introduced . . . .  [“The States have no power, by taxation, or 
otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the 
operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress, to carry 
into effect the powers vested in the national government.”[a.]]; 
second, a relationship is inferred from this structure . . . .  [“This 
principle does not extend to a tax paid by the real property of the 
Bank of the United States, in common with the other real property 
in a particular State, nor to a tax imposed on the proprietary interest 
which the citizens of that State may hold in this institution….”[b.]]; 
third, a factual assertion about the world is made . . . .  [“Nearly 
each succeeding Congress, if not every one, has acted and 
legislated on the presumption of the legal existence of such a 
power in the government . . . .  The executive government has acted 
upon it; and the courts of law have acted upon it.[c.]]  Finally, a 
conclusion is drawn that provides the rule in the case.  [“[Congress] 
has established a bank; and before the act establishing it can be 
pronounced unconstitutional and void, it must be shown, that a 
bank has no fair connection with the execution of any power or 
duty of the national government, and that its creation is 
consequently a manifest usurpation.”]17 
 
Bobbitt’s fourth modality is from a prudential point of view.  Here, Bobbitt 
notes that “the dramatic national crises of the depression and world war soon 
provided ample reason to introduce the practical effects of constitutional 
doctrine into the rationales underpinning doctrine:”18  
 
 16.  Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
 17.  Id. at 16. The bracketed quotes are this Article author’s choosing of language from 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 317 U.S. 316 (1819), to illustrate Bobbitt’s four points of a structural 
argument.  They appear in this footnote as lettered indentions below: 
  a.  McCulloch, 317 U.S. at 317 
  b.  Id. 
  c.  Id. at 323. 
  d.  Id. at 326. 
 18.  BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 16. 
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For example, one such case arose when, in the depths of the 
midwestern farm depression, the Minnesota legislature passed a 
statute providing that anyone who was unable to pay a mortgage 
could be granted a moratorium from foreclosure.  On its face such 
a statute not only appeared to realize the fears of the framers that 
state legislatures would compromise the credit market by enacting 
debtor relief statutes, but also plainly to violate the Contracts 
Clause that was the textual outcome of such concerns. Moreover, 
the structure of national economic union strongly counseled against 
permitting states to protect their constituents by exploding a 
national recovery program that depended on restoring confidence 
to banking operations.  Nevertheless[,] the Supreme Court upheld 
the statute, observing that: An emergency existed in Minnesota 
which furnished a proper occasion for the exercise of the reserved 
power of the state to protect the vital interests of the community.19 
 
Bobbitt’s fifth modality derives from caselaw when lawyers make appeals 
“in a doctrinal mode.”20  The questions he points to here is: “[C]an a state 
constitutionally aid parochial schools” by providing school students a cash 
allowance for their transportation, or would such aid “offend the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment . . . .[?]”21  Bobbitt notes that 
the caselaw has “developed a three-prong test: (1) does the state program 
have a secular purpose; (2) is its principle effect neither to advance nor 
inhibit religion; and (3) does its administration excessively entangle the state 
in religious affairs?”22  Bobbitt writes, “[a]pplying this test to the question 
above, the judge might write: ‘Everson must be distinguished from the 
instant case because the program in Everson provided transportation 
common to all students, whereas here only some students—the parochial 
ones—are given cash allowances.’”23  Alternatively, a judge might decide 
that “Everson, which also involved public transportation to parochial school 
students, governs this case.  Here as there, the state’s program provides aid 
to students and their parents, and not—as in cases that have applied Everson 
and struck down state assistance in this area—direct assistance to church-
related schools.”24  The doctrinal modality does not state which of these two 
interpretations is correct but, rather, allows the Court the opportunity to 
 
 19.  BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 16-17.  
 20.  Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added). 
 21.  Id. at 18. 
 22.  Id. at 19 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). 
 23.  Id. at 19. 
 24.  Id. 
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adopt either position, so long as the adopted position can be fitted into the 
caselaw that has come before.   
Bobbitt’s last modality is an ethical modality.25  As Bobbitt writes, 
“[t]his form of argument denotes an appeal to those elements of the 
American cultural ethos that are reflected in the Constitution.  The 
fundamental American constitutional ethos is the idea of limited 
government, which presumptively holds that all residual authority remains 
in the private sphere.”26  Bobbitt offers a hypothetical to show the basic 
pattern of such arguments.  South Carolina offered three convicted sex 
offenders a choice between a thirty-year prison sentence or drug-induced 
castration.  The hypothetical continues: 
 
Suppose a convicted man accepted the bargain and was released 
on probation terms that incorporated this pledge (as by drug-
induced impotence).  Then suppose that he ceased taking the 
prescribed drug.  If his probation were revoked, a constitutional 
challenge to the terms of his probation might take this form: 
1. The reservation to the individual of the decision to have 
children is deeply rooted in the American notion of 
autonomy; there is no express constitutional power to 
implement a program of eugenics. 
2. Moreover, such programs are not a conventionally 
appropriate means to any express power. 
3. Those means denied the federal government are also denied 
the states. 
4. The South Carolina sentence amounted to ordering a man to 
comply with eugenics scheme that deemed him ineligible 
to procreate.27 
 
The example Bobbitt uses is particularly interesting because it focuses on the 
personal autonomy of the individual, and how ensuring certain civil liberties 
protections guards this autonomy.  It is fair to say that what Bobbitt is 
expressing here, and what has been expressed in a variety of Court cases—
from Pierce v. Society of Sisters,28 to Griswold v. Connecticut,29 to Roe v. 
 
 25.  BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 19.  
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 21. 
 28.  268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 29.  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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Wade,30 to Lawrence v. Texas,31 and to Obergefell v. Hodges,32 just to name 
a few—will become central to my argument, infra Section 6, that human 
rights should become a determinative factor for constitutional 
interpretation, ranking higher than all other modalities in an assessment of 
constitutional value.   
However, a concern arises from Bobbitt’s presentation.  The truth of 
propositions of law are fundamentally different from propositions of logic.  
Whereas propositions of logic can be found to be apodictically true based 
on meanings alone, propositions of law, like propositions of experience, 
require a background framework for why they should be adopted.  This is 
particularly evident with the doctrinal modality, but also present in the 
historical, textual, prudential, and ethical modalities.  Indeed, propositions 
of law, even more than propositions of experience, require, in addition to 
how our experiences may have changed, a normative background 
framework of politics for why they ought to be accepted.  That is, legal 
propositions do not simply affirm some fact or set of facts as true, but 
instead, rely on existing normative obligations incumbent on those who 
interpret the law for what is to be done or not done.33  This is why law 
cannot be assumed to be a command from some sovereign backed by a 
threat, but must instead, even from a positivist point of view, engage a 
normative reason for what is to be upheld.34   
II.  Originalism Versus the Idea of a Living Constitution:  
A Question of Political Morality 
The previous section focused on seven modalities the Court has adopted 
in its interpretations of the United States Constitution.  What is of interest 
regarding these alternative modalities is how they are themselves justified 
by a framework of constitutional interpretation.  Recall that because they 
involve norms, they do not stand as true propositions on their own like 
 
 30.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. 
 31.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 32.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 33.  This idea that law piggybacks on an already existing normative obligation can be traced 
back to Plato, who in the Crito, has Socrates, his protagonist, defend his decision not to escape 
from the prison by appealing to background moral ideals of fair play, gratitude, and consent to 
justify his obedience to an unjust law of Athens.  See PLATO, CRITO 45b, 48c, 49d, 50b, 50c-e, 52b-
d (Project Gutenberg 1999). 
 34.  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 82-91 (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 2nd ed. 
1961) (disagrees with Austin’s positivism that law operated as a command backed by a threat 
because that would not distinguish being obliged, as when a gunman says your money or your life, 
from having an obligation).  
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modalities of logic.35  Logical modalities would fit any possible world one 
could conceive.  Legal modalities, including the ones the Court has adopted 
for constitutional interpretation, are like the modalities of science, contingent 
on fitting into the actual world in which the law operates.  In that world, one 
needs to ask, what is the goal to be achieved by the choice of modality?  
Inevitably, the goal will be connected to the values thought to be important 
to constitutional order.  Thus, the modes reside within a framework of 
political morality in which our duty to obey the law subsumes what we take 
the law to legitimately require.36  The modes of interpretation do not function 
independently of the political morality adopted by society, but rather as 
consequences of that political morality.  Only interpretations that can be 
justified within a reasonable scheme of political morality can serve as a 
source of law.   
Professor William Eskridge identifies the different canons and norms 
commentators have used for discerning constitutional meaning.37  These 
canons overlap with the modalities previously described by Bobbitt for 
understanding what the Constitution prescribes.  But even more than those 
modalities, Eskridge’s canons beg the question: why these canons?  In other 
words, they are not just another name for the modes the Court has adopted 
to interpret the law, but should be seen as transitions from the various 
theories of political morality to what the law requires.  They include: 
 
 Ordinary [original] meaning of constitutional language as it 
would have been understood by average Americans at the time 
of adoption; 
 Structure of the Constitution as a presumptively coherent plan 
for the Union, tied together by fundamental principles and 
policies that, in turn, provide a context for applying the 
Constitution; 
 Legislative history of the Constitution and its amendments 
especially state ratification debates, but also (by some 
accounts) the drafting deliberations at the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787 and in Congress (for the amendments); 
 
 35.  See BOBBITT, supra note 1. 
 36.  Elsewhere I have described this framework as a global map in which the duty to obey the 
law is discovered “not in an analytical understanding of what the law is but by way of a normative 
understanding of how actions of political institutions are justified.”   
 37.  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 363 (2016). 
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 Executive departmental interpretation, especially relevant 
where there has been legislative deliberation and acceptance 
or acquiescence; and,  
 Background meta-norms reflected in the common law 
tradition and law of nations.38 
 
Individually, each canon provides grounds for why it should be 
followed.  Undoubtedly, litigants who stand to benefit from the application 
of a specific canon in a particular case or set of cases will argue for its 
adoption.  However, it is unclear from the list how the various canons ought 
to be prioritized or when they should be applied.  If the Court is free to choose 
among the different canons or norms, and if the Court chooses to affirm one 
side or the other in a particular litigation, what will prevent the choice from 
being arbitrary or biased?39  The choice of canon or norm must be based on 
more than its service in affirming a particular interpretation.  It must also be 
based on rational grounds supporting a reasonable understanding of society’s 
political morality.  Reasonable in this context means that the society’s own 
view of its political morality may not be enough to justify its choice of canon, 
unless the canon is also capable of being reproduced by the best system of 
political morality available.  Thus, the Court should inquire into society’s 
political morality as part of its duty to follow higher law if majoritarian 
biases do not carry the day.40  Recall, one of the reasons the Framers agreed 
to adopt a Bill of Rights was to offset the argument that the Constitution may 
be used by a majority to enforce its own will to the detriment of minority and 
states’ rights.41  As a consequence, commentators like David Strauss, the late 
Justice Antonin Scalia, and Ronald Dworkin, among others, have focused 
their arguments less on the choice of canon, and more on the political 
philosophy that provides the basis for the choice.  
 David Strauss, who supports the idea that the Constitution is a living 
document, has noted: 
 
 38.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 37, at 361-63 (footnotes omitted). 
 39.  In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 239 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the death 
penalty, as applied, was arbitrary and possibly discriminatory against minority groups in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits against “cruel and unusual 
punishment.” 
 40.  See THE FEDERALIST 51 (Madison) at 321 (discussing how a system of checks and 
balances in republican government can serve not only to check the growth of factions, but to ensure 
“the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.”). 
 41.  THE BILL OF RIGHTS, American Government, U.S. HISTORY (June 22, 2019), 
http://www.ushistory.org/gov/2d.asp (“In 1789, Virginian James Madison submitted twelve 
amendments to Congress.  His intention was to answer the criticisms of the Anti-Federalists.  The 
states ratified all but two of them . . . as the Bill of Rights . . . .”). 
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The written Constitution is a short document that has been 
amended only a handful of times.  By comparison, the United 
States has over two centuries of experience grappling with the 
fundamental issues—constitutional issues—that arise in a large, 
complex, diverse, changing society.  The lessons we have learned 
in grappling with those issues only sometimes make their way into 
the text of the Constitution by way of amendments, and even then 
the amendments often occur only after the law has already 
changed.  But those lessons are routinely embodied in the cases 
that the Supreme Court decides and also, importantly, in the 
traditions and understandings that have developed outside the 
courts.42 
 
Strauss’ emphasis on the role of judgment when the words in the 
original document or its amendments cannot be reduced to a simple reading 
is significant because, unlike the reading of a statute, constitutional 
arguments should by the Preamble of the Constitution serve to “establish 
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and our Posterity…”43  In this respect, understanding constitutional law 
requires much more than an understanding of the words of the various 
Articles in the original document and its subsequent amendments; it requires 
an understanding of the precedents the Court has “shaped by notions of 
fairness and good policy” as those precedents are arguably what makes the 
Constitution viable today.44  Strauss describes this legal approach as the way 
the “common law” has operated for centuries, “long before there was a 
written U.S. Constitution.”45  But the approach stands for following the 
political morality at the heart of the tradition, which requires courts to 
consider the justice and fairness of each application, even though the 
approach itself does not offer concrete criteria for determining justice or 
fairness.  In this sense, the interpretative tradition that has animated 
American constitutional law fails the positivist test of pedigree since every 
constitutional decision of the Court will not necessarily rest its grounding on 
the specific intentions or purposes of the Framers.  Oftentimes, the Court will 
find it necessary to inquire into the political morality of the subject itself.   
 
 42.  DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 34-35 (2010). 
 43.  See id. at 35. 
 44.  Id. at 36. 
 45.  STRAUSS, supra note 42, at 36. 
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Strauss uses an example from contract law to illustrate common law 
innovations46 in the line of privity of contract cases beginning with 
Winterbottom v. Wright,47 and continuing through to MacPhearson v. Buick 
Motor Company.48  In Winterbottom v. Wright, Winterbottom was employed 
by a company providing Postmaster General drivers to deliver mail.49  
Wright was under contract with the Postmaster General to provide and keep 
the coaches used by the Postmaster General in good working order.50  After 
Winterbottom suffered injuries from a latent defect in the coach he was 
driving, he attempted to sue Wright for nonfeasance of his contract with the 
Postmaster General.51  The Court of the Exchequer held that, in the absence 
of a contract between Winterbottom and Wright, Winterbottom’s lawsuit 
could not go forward.52  The principle of law that emerged from this case 
was that one could not maintain a suit for nonfeasance absent privity of 
contract.53  Ten years later, in the New York case Thomas v. Winchester,54 
Mrs. Thomas was erroneously prescribed a medicinal, extract of dandelion.55  
Due to a mislabeling by the manufacturer, Winchester, the pharmacist, 
mistakenly issued Mrs. Thomas extract of belladonna, a known poison.56  
When the manufacturer appealed to nonsuit the case, the New York State 
Court of Appeals held that suit could proceed because putting a mislabeled 
bottle of medicine on the market was “inherently dangerous,” 
notwithstanding the lack of contract between the parties, as it was unlikely 
the mislabeling would be discovered before causing injury.57  In effect, the 
no-privity principle was now subject to an exception for inherently 
dangerous items.  Finally, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 
defendant, MacPherson, purchased a Buick motor car from a retail dealer.58  
Defendant suffered injuries when the wheel on his automobile collapsed, and 
sued the manufacturer for negligence.59  In holding that the defendant’s suit 
 
 46.  Id. at 80-85. 
 47.  152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). 
 48.  217 N.Y. 382 (1916). 
 49.  Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 403. 
 50.  Id. at 402-03. 
 51.  Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 403. 
 52.  Id. at 404-05. 
 53.  Id. at 405. 
 54.  6 N.Y. 397 (1852). 
 55.  Id. at 398. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  6 N.Y. 397 at 409. 
 58.  MacPherson, 217 N.Y. 384. 
 59.  Id. at 385. 
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could proceed, Judge Benjamin Cardozo, writing the Opinion for the court, 
noted that the manufacturer had reason to know a negligently produced 
automobile would cause harm, as well as that the product would ultimately 
be sold to a dealer and consumer, neither of whom would be expected to 
inspect it.60  In effect, what had been the exception to the no-privity rule in 
Thomas, was now the rule in MacPherson, and the previous no-privity rule 
was now the exception.61   
On the surface, this line of cases appears reasonable, and the results are 
fair and just.  Manufacturers should not be able to avoid liability to the 
ultimate consumer by placing products on the market that are likely to have 
undiscovered defects, which could be defective and cause serious injuries. 62  
Yet one could still ask whether the Courts’ sense of justice in these cases is 
related to anything firmer than the arbitrary whims of judges, even if 
holdings encapsulate what most people believe to be fair.  Indeed, realist 
Justices, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, believe that the law of a case is 
simply what the judges are willing to do to resolve controversies.63  But even 
if that is true for common law tort and contract cases, and even if the court 
decisions in those cases appear quite satisfying to the general public, the lack 
of any bright-line rule for how these issues are to be determined or the weight 
to be assigned to particular concerns, provides courts with little direction, 
especially where the issues themselves are often unclear and the 
constitutional structure for the separation of powers seems absolute.  Thus, 
before committing to a full-fledged acceptance of the living Constitution 
approach, it is necessary to further investigate the spectrum of political 
morality behind the Constitution to better understand the ideal interpretation.  
This need for further investigation is most apparent in the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s now iconic decision, Brown v. Board of Education.64  
Professor Strauss noted: 
 
 60.  Id. at 389. 
 61.  See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 25 (1949). 
 62.  STRAUSS, supra note 42, at 84 (Strauss states that “Cardozo was, therefore, in a position 
to argue that his ultimate conclusion—that the privity regime should be discarded in favor of a 
simple requirement of foreseeability—not only was good policy but was implicitly supported by 
several decades’ worth of decisions.”).   
 63.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap 
Press 1963) (1881) (As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has stated: “The life of the law has not been 
logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political 
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share 
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules 
by which men should be governed.”). 
 64.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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We know from private papers that several justices who were 
part of the unanimous Court in Brown were initially unsure 
of what to do because, while they individually opposed 
segregation, they were at least initially troubled about 
whether the Court could lawfully declare segregation to be 
unconstitutional.  Herbert Wechsler, a law professor who 
helped the civil rights lawyers prepare their case in Brown, 
later wrote that Brown could not be justified in principle 
legal terms.65   
 
Nevertheless, Strauss goes on to point out that: 
 
Today, Brown is not just accepted; it is an icon.  The lawfulness of 
Brown is a fixed point for the mainstream legal culture.  Anyone 
who doubts that Brown is lawful is a fringe player, at best.  It is, for 
example, inconceivable that anyone could get appointed, or 
confirmed, to a federal judgeship if it became known that he or she 
thought that Brown was unlawful.66   
 
Strauss further comments that “any theory about the U.S. Constitution must 
explain, and justify, Brown.”67  But the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
speak on racial equality.  Instead, Originalists make odd use of history to 
narrow this bit of language to reflect a different view, which they could have 
directly expressed at the time.  If the Framers intended to afford equal 
protection specifically for matters of racial equality, they possessed the 
writing abilities to express what they meant.  Their failure to do so not only 
gave rise to the Court’s later decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,68 (now dead as 
a precedent post-Brown) but, nevertheless, indicated what they may have 
expected to be the consequences of what they wrote.  Recall that the Framers 
of the original Constitution of 1787 provided that slavery should be a 
continued practice, at least until 1808,69 suggesting that they understood that 
future generations may reconsider the consequences of Originalist decisions.   
The notion that the Framers would leave some questions open only to 
be resolved by the developing political morality of society is also found in 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual 
 
 65.  STRAUSS, supra note 42, at 77-78. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 78-79. 
 68.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 69.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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punishments.”70  Does the definition of cruel and unusual punishments 
depend only on what the Framers of the Eighth Amendment considered to 
be cruel and unusual in 1791, or is it open to the interpretation of Americans 
in the 21st century?  There is evidence that what the Framers thought to be 
cruel and unusual punishments at the time was less derived from a true 
Originalist understanding of their own legal history, and more a political 
point of view regarding the anticipated perception of how they foresaw 
future generations defining cruel and unusual punishments.71   
The particular question for the current generation arises in the context 
of the imposition of the death penalty.  But, if the Eighth Amendment’s 
meaning is open to what today’s Americans consider to be “cruel and 
unusual,” Originalists will ask: in what sense does the Constitution in 
general, and the Bill of Rights in particular, protect other areas of minority 
rights from the influences of different combinations of factions forming the 
majority?  These kinds of concerns may explain why Originalists will often 
advocate for a narrower interpretation of the Constitution’s meaning, based 
on the understanding of the Framers at the time of enactment.   
Originalists, in contrast to those who adopt the “living,” common law 
approach to constitutional interpretation, share the core idea “that when we 
give meanings to the words of the Constitution, we should use the meanings 
that the people who adopted those constitutional provisions would have 
assigned.”72  To the Originalist, changes to traditions and understandings are 
less important than preserving what the authors of the words meant when 
they wrote, for example, the Eighth Amendment.  In effect, they determine 
what would follow, unless the Constitution was amended through the process 
described in Article V, which would change the actual language of the 
document.73  Consequently, with regard to the aforementioned death penalty 
example, Originalists argue that if the authors of the Bill of Rights did not 
consider the death penalty to be cruel and unusual in 1791, then it should not 
be considered cruel and unusual today.  For Justice Scalia, a self-proclaimed 
Originalist, the living Constitution approach does “not seek to facilitate 
social change but to prevent it” by constitutionalizing contemporary trends 
in our understanding of the language, thus bringing the issue outside the 
 
 70.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 71.  Cf. Anthony F. Granucci, No Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original 
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 865 (1969) (arguing that the American Framers of the Eighth 
Amendment misinterpreted Blackstone and early English law by proscribing "not excessive but 
torturous punishments”). 
 72.  STRAUSS, supra note 42, at 10. 
 73.  STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 42, at 36-37. 
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democratic process.74  Is Scalia correct that if the Court follows an Originalist 
position, it must necessarily leave in place the right of the states and the 
federal government to decide whether to continue the death penalty for 
certain crimes?  Scalia himself acknowledges, “I do not suggest, mind you, 
that Originalists always agree upon their answer.  There is plenty of room 
for disagreement as to what the original meaning was, and even more as to 
how that original meaning applies to the current situation before the court.”75   
Professor Ronald Dworkin identifies one place for disagreement as the 
words the Framers chose when drafting the Eighth Amendment.  Dworkin 
distinguishes “semantic originalism” from “expectation originalism.”76  The 
former “insists that rights-granting clauses be read to say what those who 
made them intended to say.”77  The latter “holds that these clauses should be 
understood to have the consequences that those who wrote them expected 
them to have.”78  The two understandings are not the same, as words can 
have a broader intension from the extensional objects one might expect them 
to apply to, not to mention the fact that the intension might change over 
time.79  Dworkin goes on to explain: 
Consider, to see the difference, the Brown question: does the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of “equal protection of 
the laws” forbid racial segregation in public schools?  We 
know that the majority of the members of Congress who 
voted for that amendment did not expect or intend it to have 
that consequence: they themselves sustained racial 
segregation in the schools of the District of Columbia.  So 
an expectation-originalist would interpret the Fourteenth 
Amendment to permit segregation and would declare the 
Court’s decision wrong.  But there is no plausible 
interpretation of what these statesmen meant to say, in 
laying down the language “equal protection of the laws,” 
that entitles us to conclude that they declared segregation 
 
 74.  ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 42 (1997). 
 75.  SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra 
note 74, at 45. 
 76.  Ronald Dworkin, Comment on ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, 119 (1997). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  “Intension” refers to a word or phrase’s meaning, rather than the psychological state of 
the author.  Extension, by contrasts, refers only to the objects subsumed by the word or phrase.  See 
Intension and Extension: Logic and Semantics, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www. 
britannica.com/topic/intension (last visited June 22, 2019). 
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constitutional.  On the contrary, as the Supreme Court held, 
the best understanding of their semantic intentions supposes 
that they meant to, and did, lay down a general principle of 
political morality which (it had become clear by 1954) 
condemns racial segregation.  So, on that ground, a 
semantic-originalist would concur in the Court’s decision.80 
 
Similarly, a semantic-originalist would adopt a different position from 
an expectation-originalist regarding the Eighth Amendment.  Consider what 
Dworkin says are two different accounts of what “the Framers intended to 
say in the Eighth Amendment:”81 
 
The first reading supposes that the Framers intended to say, 
by using the words “cruel and unusual,” that punishments 
generally thought cruel at the time they spoke were to be 
prohibited—that is, that they would have expressed 
themselves more clearly if they had used the phrase 
“punishments widely regarded as cruel and unusual at the 
date of this enactment” in place of the misleading language 
they actually used.  The second reading supposes that they 
intended to lay down an abstract principle forbidding 
whatever punishments are in fact cruel and unusual.  Of 
course, if the correct translation is the first version, then 
capital punishment does not violate the Eighth Amendment.  
But if the second, principled, translation is a more accurate 
account of what they intended to say, the question remains 
open.82 
 
Why does the question remain open if the second version is correct?  
Because, even from an Originalist position, the Framers’ use of abstract 
versus more concrete language suggests that they intended for consideration 
of what punishment qualifies as “cruel and unusual” in light of changing 
understandings of justice and fairness, human psychology, and social 
climate.  So, contrary to Originalist presumptions, Originalist thinking will 
not always, or even mostly, lead to what the Framers expected.  Nor is it by 
any means clear that Originalism will be better equipped to protect the rights 
of minorities than the more common law-like, living Constitution approach.  
As Dworkin points out, 
 
 80.  Dworkin, supra note 76, at 119 (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 483). 
 81.  Id. at 120. 
 82.  Id. 
(DO NOT DELETE) 10/29/2019  10:47 AM 
Fall 2019] RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 101 
[m]any conservative judges therefore reject semantic 
originalism as undemocratic; elected judges, they say, should 
not have that responsibility.  Scalia gives nearly the opposite 
reason: he says the moral reading gives the people not too 
little but too much power, because it politicizes the 
appointment of Supreme Court justices and makes it more 
likely that justices will be appointed who reflect the changing 
moods of the majority.  He fears the constitutional rights of 
individuals will suffer.83 
 
Justice Scalia suggests that the moral reading of the Constitution allows for 
potential tyranny of the majority to offset individual rights of the minority.  
Undoubtedly, Justice Scalia is concerned about property rights, which have 
been diminished since the advent of the New Deal.84  However, Dworkin 
views the situation differently.  He writes: 
 
History disagrees [with Scalia’s position].  Justices whose 
methods seem closest to the moral reading of the 
Constitution have been champions, not enemies, of 
individual rights, and, as the political defeat of Robert 
Bork’s nomination taught us, the people seem content not 
only with the moral reading but with its individualist 
implications.85 
 
Neither position provides a clear, knock-out win for “which individual 
rights are genuine and important and about whether the moral reading is a 
threat or an encouragement” because, “in the end the magnet of political 
morality is the strongest force in jurisprudence,” and that magnet may 
operate in different directions.86   
Where does this leave the discussion of the two most common forms of 
debate about the correct approach to constitutional interpretation?  Arguably, 
each approach has something unique to offer, yet each is both theoretically 
and practically open to various challenges from those who believe it either 
undemocratic or insufficiently capable of protecting minority rights.  
Originalism, in the narrow sense of expectation-Originalism, may protect 
those who fear that current coalitions of majorities may undermine 
previously acknowledged rights they hold dear.  However, expectation-
 
 83.  Dworkin, supra note 76, at 126. 
 84.  See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 74, at 41-42. 
 85.  Dworkin, supra note 76, at 126-27. 
 86.  See id. at 127. 
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Originalism runs the risk of being unable to account for the Framers’ use of 
abstract language in some constitutional provisions, and concrete language 
in others.  It also ignores the very real possibility that the Framers believed 
this difference was necessary in order to protect basic rights and values 
enshrined in abstract language from being circumscribed by a particular 
historical point of view.   
Here, the idea of a living Constitution can be used to ensure the 
evolution of rights and values that adjust according to changing political, 
cultural, and moral understandings.  The question is: whose rights and which 
values are ensured by the Constitution?  There is also the argument that 
suggests resolving changing viewpoints by way of the supermajority Article 
V amendment process, which avoids the possibility of a tyranny of the 
majority.  Problematically, the Article V amendment process can be thwarted 
by momentary legislative majorities, whose preferences are not always likely 
to consider the basic rights of individuals recognized by the best of society’s 
current political, cultural, and moral understandings.  Moreover, it tends to 
be a long-drawn-out process for issues that might have an immediate impact 
on individual lives.87  However, use of Article V seems necessary to repeal 
either an original Article or an Amendment, since those are at the heart of 
the Constitution.88   
Therefore, a new kind of interpretation is needed: one chosen to 
secure the legitimate interests of those minorities who may not receive 
majority favor, which, more often than not, are presented in individual cases 
where basic rights are supremely vulnerable to societal indifference.  As it 
stands, neither approach provides a complete and morally satisfactory 
formulation of what should accompany judgments about constitutional 
matters, let alone why such judgments should matter, given that those who 
wrote the Constitution and Bill of Rights are long since dead.  Thus, if the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights shall continue to function as higher law that 
influences modern day America, it is urgent to consider, as a possible 
foundation for the interpretivist question, the origin of constitutional 
authority.   
 
 
 87.  Most pertinent to this Article are issues involving women’s reproductive rights, marriage 
equality, racial discrimination, and sex discrimination. 
 88.  See Vincent J. Samar, Can A Constitutional Amendment Be Unconstitutional?  
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.667, 687-94 (2008).  Contra YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: THE LIMITS OF AMENDMENT POWERS 82-100 (2017).  (It is 
unclear, however, if an amendment could legitimately repeal any fundamental rights that are a part 
of the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment, since these constitute not only an essential part 
of what the Constitution stands for, but also, as human rights, are themselves part of higher law.).   
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III. Social Contract as the Forerunner of a Tradition 
Why should Americans care about the intent of those who wrote the 
Constitution more than two-and-a-quarter centuries ago, or those who wrote 
the Fourteenth Amendment a century-and-a-half ago?  It is quite common to 
think of the Constitution and the Amendments following it as setting forth 
the social contract among “We the People” for how the Government of the 
United States and the various state governments operate.  The problem with 
this view is that social contract theory fails to explain, beyond the first 
generation, why subsequent generations should be obliged to follow the 
directives of those who are now long since dead.89  Indeed, none other than 
Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence, questioned 
“whether one generation of men has a right to bind another.”90  Jefferson 
goes on to argue that if generations are defined to exist only for a set time, 
no debt assumed by one generation could be passed on to a future generation 
which had not agreed to the obligation.91  His argument extinguishes the 
claim that society could impose this obligation based on an original Lockean 
natural right; Jefferson identifies the practical constraint that each 
generation, as a whole, is granted by nature only a specific finite time for its 
existence.92  Consequently, nature and the rights of nature seem to prevent 
any such obligation from being passed on to subsequent generations. 
On the contrary, one might argue that since whole generations do not 
simply die out at a specific time, society may be represented by an 
overlapping consensus of those members who accede to the previous 
obligations.  Even if this were the case, would the obligation only go so far, 
and no farther, than those who had accepted the previous obligation?  This 
is not a matter of adopting an amendment, but of reaffirming what is already 
in place.93  Continuation of constitutional authority is part of the background 
framework of the tradition under which the Constitution operates, as well as 
why major changes in structure ought to require an amendment.  More 
importantly, since that tradition has continued, at least in its broader 
structural aspects, from generation to generation, with Supreme Court 
 
 89.  JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 374-75 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (In the Second Treatise, Locke presents his social contract theory.  He 
begins by noting that “Men being … by Nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put 
out of his Estate, and subject to the Political Power of another, without his own Consent.”).   
 90.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in THE LIFE AND 
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 488 (Random House, N.Y., 1944). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), supra note 91, at 488.  
 93.  See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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decisions adjusting only its details,94 while the various amendments adjust 
its larger scope and promise (especially the Reconstruction Amendments), 95 
that tradition should now also be seen as constituting a significant part of the 
American identity.96   
Still, Jefferson’s point extends beyond whether past financial debts 
might be honored in the future.  He was more concerned with the structure 
and obligations imposed by the Constitution, as well as the meanings and 
intent of those who authored it.  Indeed, the basic structures of the 
government, along with the reasons for its creation—to provide a system of 
checks and balances, to ensure federal separation of powers, and to guarantee 
a substantial degree of state sovereignty—can be found in the arguments 
leading up to the Constitution’s ratification.97  However, the values under 
which those systems operate have undergone profound changes, especially 
with the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments at the end of the Civil 
War, which brought onto the national stage, in varying degrees at different 
times, a much greater emphasis on individual freedom and equality that 
would obligate the states as much as the federal government.98  In part, this 
 
 94  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803). 
 95  1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 58 (1991) (The American Constitutional 
Historian, Bruce Ackerman, has described the American Constitution as comprising Three 
Republics: “the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal,” the Reconstruction period being 
defined by passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.).   
 96  The argument is that the Constitution becomes a part of the American ethos, so long as it 
continues to be seen as legitimate because it is grounded in a set of values Americans respect as 
important.  That way of looking at legitimacy is significantly different from the way Max Weber 
considered legitimacy.  The justification for the original constitution and the subsequent 
amendments, especially the Reconstruction Amendments, might be grounded on the social contract 
created between the then living members of society or their representatives as set out in Articles V 
(amendments) and VII (ratification) of the U.S. Constitution.  That much fits Max Weber’s notion 
of a legal “rational ground” originally affording legitimacy to the Constitution and its subsequent 
amendments.  See 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 215, 217-220 (Guenther Roth and 
Claus Wittich eds., 1978).  But, as this Article hopes to show, that legal rational grounds 
explanation of Constitution’s legitimacy breaks down when the members to the original social 
contract or the social contract that gave birth to the Reconstruction Amendments are no longer 
alive.  In these instances, for the Constitution to continue to remain legitimate, a different notion of 
legitimacy will be required.  The notion presented here allows for the creation of a tradition capable 
of adapting to a changing world by the inclusion of additional human rights norms that that are 
themselves respected, even though they may affect the importance of norms already present.  This 
is not Weber’s “traditional grounds” approach, which demands personal loyalty to persons within 
an “immemorial tradition.”  But cf. id. at 215, 226-27.  As a consequence, the approach here will 
require an appeal to a still higher set of moral norms so that it does not just become a peg-board for 
posting any values that gain popular attention. 
 97  See generally 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand 
ed.,1937) (providing information that helped frame the Constitution for submission to the states). 
 98  See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.  A brief review of how the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause would come to be seen as a basis for ending segregation, 
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is related to the changing role of the United States Supreme Court, which has 
evolved from its original emphasis clarifying the boundaries of federalism to 
what, following the Great Depression and the New Deal, has become an 
institution set upon protecting individual rights more broadly, the latter in 
keeping with the Fourteenth Amendment right to ensure equality under the 
law.99  The Court’s willingness to back away from just emphasizing the 
preservation of state rights and the individual civil rights of white men 
produced a shift in interpretation toward paying greater attention to the rights 
of women, illegitimate children, and gays and lesbians, as well as showing 
respect for a larger federal role of securing the general welfare, even when 
this meant placing less emphasis on protecting previously important property 
rights.100   
Precisely how these new arrangements became a part of the American 
legal and political landscape is interesting given the ever-widening 
consensus required by the country’s expansion and population growth, as 
well as the United States becoming an ever-growing political and economic 
player in the 21st century.  Currently, the country’s two major oceans no 
longer provide the security or isolation from the world’s problems that may 
have existed at an earlier time.  Today, what happens economically on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange affects what happens in the economic markets of 
London, New York, and Chicago.101  Nor is the United States unaffected by 
 
and later be adopted to guaranteeing equal protection for women, as well as gays and lesbians, will 
be set out in Section 6.  See infra Part 6. 
 99.  See U.S. v. Caroline Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938) (noting “here may be 
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on 
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten 
Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the 
Fourteenth”). 
 100.  John Locke, whose writings strongly influenced Thomas Jefferson, held the natural rights 
view that upon birth “every Man has a Property in his own Person.  This no Body has any Right to 
but himself.  The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his.  
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in [common to 
everyone], he had mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby 
makes it his Property.” LOCKE, supra note 89, § 27.  This view, when interpreted by libertarians, 
undercuts government regulation of private property that might be aimed at protecting the health 
and safety of workers.  This is because, under Locke’s view, government is limited to protecting 
those pre-political rights afforded in the state of nature.  See Lockner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 
(holding a New York statute that limited bakers to a 40-hour work week violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  But ought this to be the whole of government’s 
responsibilities when the Constitution itself states that government is established “to promote the 
general Welfare.”  U.S CONST. pmbl.  See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) 
(upholding the constitutionality of state minimum wage legislation). 
 101.  See Stock Exchanges Around the World, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.invest 
opedia.com/financial-edge/1212/stock-exchanges-around-the-world.aspx (last visited May 29, 
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terrorism, whether global or domestic,102 or climate change, also caused by 
human pollution entering the atmosphere, especially from newly developing 
industrial nations, like China.103  Additionally, with the arrival of the global 
internet, the relative physical isolation caused by its two oceans no longer 
secures the United States from outside threats (putting aside its shared 
borders with Canada and Mexico) because hackers residing anywhere in the 
world can potentially cause great harm to the United States infrastructure 
(such as its electrical grid104), but also, and perhaps more importantly, to its 
democratic system of politics.105   
Social contract theory, when considered within a tradition that 
reconstructs the past to accommodate living in an ever-changing economic 
and political world, can set out purposes and obligations that respond to 
Jefferson’s concern because it finds a common denominator to operate 
between generations.  Tradition serves as the common denominator by 
allowing for a higher-ordered connection to emerge between what came 
previously and what is common and necessary today.  Whereas, at one time 
it may have been thought that the values that separate higher law from 
ordinary law set forth a clear boundary between the Constitution and 
statutory law, that boundary is not impervious to outside pressures from real-
world conditions.  The requirement that any change to basic structures 
preserve liberty and equality is the protection higher law affords, both by 
way of the formal amendment process and by requiring courts to be 
cognizant of values that could be supported by a populace with various 
political ideologies.106   
 
2019); see also Economy: Impact of the World Economy, THEUSAONLINE.COM, https://www. 
theusaonline.com/economy/world-economy.htm (last visited May 29, 2019). 
 102.  See Part IV: What is the threat to the United States Today? In Terrorism in America After 
9/11, NEW AMERICA, https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/what-threat-
united-states-today/ (last visited May 29, 2019); see also Natasha Bach, Domestic Terrorism is on 
the Rise.  But How Prepared is the U.S. to Counter It? FORTUNE (Apr. 4, 2019), http://fort 
une.com/2019/04/04/dhs-domestic-terrorism/. 
 103.  See Scott Moore & Michelle Melton, China’s Pivot on Climate Change and National 
Security, LAWFARE (Apr. 2, 2019, 2:43 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-pivot-climate-
change-and-national-security. 
 104.  Danny Bradbury, Electrical Grid Hacking Makes US Top Threat List, INFOSECURITY 
MAGAZINE: INFOSEC BLOG (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/infosec/elec 
tricity-grid-hacking-makes-us-1-1/. 
 105.  Frances Robles, Russian Hackers Were ‘In a Position’ to Alter Florida Voter Rolls, Rubio 
Confirms, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/us/florida-russia-
hacking-election.html. 
 106.  This process can be illustrated by compromises agreed to by both major political parties 
since the Twelfth Amendment requires “a majority of the whole number of the Electors appointed” 
to elect the President; otherwise the choice will be made by the House of Representatives.  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XII. 
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Jefferson’s concern is the traditional contract law point we met in 
Winterbottom v. Wright, namely, that absent privity of contract, no 
obligations exist under a contract.107  However, one must not overlook the 
work done by Jefferson’s very explicit example: in a normal contract, either 
party can assign their rights under the contract to other persons including 
future generations.108  They cannot assign their obligations and liabilities to 
third parties without the third parties’ consent, since such a transfer would 
constitute a novation requiring new consideration.109  Consequently, under 
Jefferson’s example, the rights the Framers agreed to are assigned to future 
generations, but any obligations or duties are not.  However, in reality, whole 
generations do not enter into and exit existence at a single moment in time.  
There will always be people to convince each subsequent generation of the 
benefit to be gained by continuing the social contract, at least regarding its 
most important obligations.  Moreover, there will be obligations that arise 
outside the contract as we saw in the Thomas and MacPhearson cases.  
Together, both intergenerational effort and the emergence of new 
obligations, give rise to a cross-generational recognition of a political 
tradition that strongly affirms maintaining much of the prior social contract, 
but only if adjustments can be and are, in fact, made to meet changing 
conditions.   
Cross-generational traditions are culturally well-known, as they are 
commonly exhibited through customs and beliefs that connect different 
generations together.110  This applies to family, religion, and culture, but can 
also be associated with other kinds of norms that afford stability, meaning, 
and security.111  The idea that people regularly associate together by way of 
a tradition is a familiar concept, and serves as a basis to develop one’s own 
identity as a member of a family or community.112  Perhaps more 
significantly, each new generation finds its own identity, inevitably creating 
conflicts due to changed circumstances or new challenges, which require 
rethinking old ways of accommodation, and developing new strategies for 
 
 107.  See 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). 
 108.  Richard Stim, What is an Assignment of a Contract? What Happens When Rights and 
Duties Under a Contract are Assigned to a Third Party?  NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/assignment-of-contract-basics-32643.html (last visited May 26, 2019). 
 109.  See Novation, FARLEX, THE FREE DICTIONARY, https://legal-dictionary.thefreediction 
ary.com/novate (last visited May 26, 2019). 
 110.  See Chelsey Byers Gerstenecker, Family Life: Traditions, Customs Help Strengthen 
Families, Communities, NEWS-GAZETTE (Nov. 27, 2018), http://www.news-gazette.com/livi 
ng/2018-11-27/family-life-traditions-customs-help-strengthen-families-communities.html. 
 111.  The Effect of Family Culture on Family Foundations, COUNCIL OF FOUNDATIONS, 
https://www.cof.org/content/effects-family-culture-family-foundations (last visited May 21, 2019). 
 112.  See id. 
(DO NOT DELETE) 10/29/2019  10:47 AM 
108 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 47:1 
managing various situations.113  If the tradition is to maintain continuity 
between generations, the tradition must adapt to new challenges, and not 
hold fast to past expectations.  This does not mean giving up all past values 
and structures, but instead accommodating those values and structures to the 
new challenges presented.  Most values and structures allow for this, if 
perceived as part of the larger normative system in which they operate.  Of 
course, if this is to occur, the values of the tradition must not be too 
historically confined, nor the structures so rigid as to prevent innovation.   
A better approach to constitutional interpretation is thus needed; one 
that must connect current and future generations by appealing to some 
further set of norms that also constitute higher law.  Tradition will be part of 
this effort, but only insofar as it provides a place where one’s identity with 
the past remains relevant.  This requires that the tradition be able to answer 
two very pressing questions: First, must American identity necessarily be 
associated with having a connection to the past?  Second, given tradition’s 
role in the development of an identity, exactly how far should the past remain 
relevant today?  Does the tradition extend, for example, to past expectations 
for what “should” be done, even if those answers are no longer thought 
helpful to resolving current needs?  Are there beliefs that are so deeply rooted 
in the tradition that one’s identity with the tradition cannot be maintained 
without those beliefs?  Of course, if no change is possible, and the reasons 
for accepting past beliefs are few, if at all, there is a high likelihood that the 
tradition will simply die off.   
These questions are at the heart of both the Jeffersonian problem 
previously described, and the broader concern of this Article to determine 
the obligations that the Constitution and its amendments impose on society 
today.  The latter is relevant because Congress’ authority, to make laws that 
society is legally obligated to obey, is limited by the authority assigned to it 
under the Constitution.  A tradition is capable of affording such respect for 
higher law, provided the higher law is made adaptable to the present.  
Beyond those who merely adopt the tradition, how can a tradition 
legitimately claim to impose an obligation on others who may not support 
it?  This is where legitimacy comes in: it is absolutely essential that enough 
members of society still perceive themselves as being bound to a certain 
tradition they continue to find valuable, such that they are willing to assert 
their collective authority to impose that tradition on others to ensure 
conformity.   
Such a strong-armed approach of forcing tradition onto others will only 
make sense in a situation where the approach serves some higher good, such 
 
 113.  See The Effect of Family Culture on Family Foundations, supra note 111. 
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as getting at truth or achieving justice and fairness.  But such higher goods 
must then fall outside the specific constitutional tradition in something still 
more general and universal that is capable of justifying the tradition at hand.  
This second-level higher tradition provides what might be claimed as moral 
reasons for any determination offered at the first-level, including, in some 
cases, reasons for not following the original tradition, or at least not 
following it too closely if justice or fairness are not obviously assured.  
Essentially, the obligation to be part of a tradition then may itself require a 
higher-ordered explanation residing outside the tradition if it is to avoid 
serious moral criticism.  If so, the second-level higher-ordered explanation 
may set the boundaries of the tradition it also justifies.  Arguably, this is the 
place where universal morality and universal human rights ought to be 
considered, as will be described below.  For now, when considering the 
duties a constitution imposes on a society, it is worth noting a remark by 
Professor Lon Fuller, that: 
 
No written constitution can be self-executing.  To be 
effective it requires not merely the respectful deference we 
show for ordinary legal enactments, but that willing 
convergence of effort we give to moral principles in which 
we have an active belief.  One may properly work to amend 
a constitution, but so long as it remains unamended, one 
must work with it, not against it or around it.  All this 
amounts to saying that to be effective a written constitution 
must be accepted, at least provisionally, not just as law, but 
as good law.114  
 
If constitutions are accepted in a way that is similar to that of traditions, then 
this analysis does much to explain why present-day Americans continue to 
find the Constitution authoritative.  On reflection, what is followed by the 
overwhelming number of society’s members, absent overt coercion, is 
thought, at least provisionally, to be good, and more so if it allows for further 
molding to meet unexpected challenges.  This is not to say that having a pro-
attitude need be the only basis for identifying with a tradition, but it 
motivates members of a society to follow a tradition.   
The pro-attitude idea also does much to explain the broad bipartisan 
support of the rise of the regulatory state in the first-half of the 20th 
 
 114.  Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 72 HARV. L. REV. 
630, 642 (1958) (arguing against Professor Hart’s thesis for a separation of law and morals in 
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958)). 
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century.115  The idea behind the original Constitution was to make 
“lawmaking cumbersome, representative, and consensual” because this was 
thought necessary to protect liberty in the nineteenth century; “the regulatory 
agency was a workaround to make lawmaking efficient, specialized, and 
purposeful,”116 because this was necessary to accommodate welfare in the 
20th century.  Both views were ways for the Constitution to alleviate fears 
of an overzealous, strong, central government, while simultaneously meeting 
its Preamble requirement to “promote the general Welfare.”117   
Since the pro-attitude idea is manifested in following a tradition that 
affords it sanctity, logically, it will want to consider past understandings but 
not limit itself to any specific past interpretation.  As the philosopher Joseph 
Raz has noted, constitutions are viewed as legitimate, or “self-validating,” 
provided “they remain within the boundaries set by moral principles.”118  
This occurs when the interpretations represent what is worthy of moral 
attention because it seems to focus on the most important interests of 
society’s members.   
David Strauss brings this point home to Originalists with his historical 
discussion of James Madison decidedly supporting the Second Bank of the 
United States.119  When Alexander Hamilton first proposed the Bank of the 
United States, Madison vehemently opposed, arguing that the Constitution 
did not authorize such an expansion of federal power.120  Madison said, at 
the time, that any alteration in the Constitution would be a usurpation if not 
accomplished through Article V: 
 
After an extensive debate on its constitutionality, Congress 
enacted legislation establishing the bank.  When the term of 
the First Bank of the United States expired, Congress re-
chartered it. Madison, then president, vetoed the bill re-
chartering the bank—but explicitly on non-constitutional 
grounds.  By now it was 1815, twenty-five years after 
Hamilton first proposed the bank, and Madison explained 
that he considered the issue of constitutionality to be 
“precluded…by various recognitions under varied 
 
 115.  Christopher DeMuth, The Regulatory State, NATIONAL AFFAIRS (2012), https://www.na 
tionalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-regulatory-state. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 118.  JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW 
AND PRACTICAL REASON 348 (2009). 
 119.  STRAUSS, supra note 42, at 123-25. 
 120.  Id. at 123. 
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circumstances of the validity of such an institution in acts of 
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of 
Government, accompanied by indications, in different 
modes, of a concurrence in the general will of the nation . . 
. . A year later, Madison showed his endorsement of the 
living Constitution was not empty when he signed the bill 
creating the Second Bank of the United States.”121 
 
What Strauss perceives as Madison’s evolution toward a living Constitution 
perspective could easily fit the view offered here, of a Constitution capable 
of innovation, but grounded in a set of binding human rights principles.  
Indeed, the modern regulatory state, which finds no antecedent language in 
the Constitution, but is the source of much federal power, is illustrative of a 
transmission of legislative authority by Congress to agencies, to set up and 
protect the economic and financial needs of the nation.122  The Court’s 
decisions that upheld this transmission, as well as those that extended basic 
rights to new classes of individuals, provide another example.123  Despite 
these congressional and judicial changes in direction, and the public’s 
subsequent acceptance of those changes, a kind of schizophrenia in 
American psyche remains that animates ongoing political debate 
surrounding these questions.  For example, most Americans believe federal 
employees “who work for federal regulatory agencies do the best they can to 
impose the rules and regulations fairly and impartially,” yet still an 
overwhelmingly high number of Americans hold the view “that top leaders 
of regulatory agencies use their power to pursue personal agendas.”  Sixty-
seven percent believe regulators and “big businesses” work together in ways 
that are harmful and unfair to consumers.124  Since most of these concerns 
fall within congressional oversight, this difference in public attitude should 
have no constitutional significance.  Once again, innovations continue to 
resolve and sometimes create current challenges while keeping faith with 
past limitations.  When combined with the Court’s recognition of current 
serious needs, such innovations as the creation of the regulatory state, or the 
Court’s recognition of a right to privacy that protects a woman’s right to 
terminate a pregnancy, or an expansion of the fundamental right to marry to 
include same-sex couples, are still found to be constitutionally salient.  This 
 
 121.  STRAUSS, supra note 42, at 123-24. 
 122.  See STRAUSS, supra note 42, at 121. 
 123.  See id. at 125-26. 
 124.  Scott Rasmussen, Americans Continue to Reject Regulatory State, REAL CLEAR POLITICS 
(Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/01/24/americans_continue_to_r 
eject_the_regulatory_state_139264.html. 
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provides the framework for how the Court’s present perception of the 
underlying human rights purposes of the Constitution may be seen as having 
evolved from its original Preamble goals to answer the question: How is 
American identity necessarily connected with the past?   
The answer to the second question of how far the past should remain 
relevant is more complex.  It presupposes not merely the existence of a pro-
attitude for following the Constitution and its subsequent amendments and 
Court interpretations between generations, but the need for specific 
limitations as to what rights warrant constitutional protection, and how 
various structures might accordingly be adjusted.  This is an important and 
separate question from whether identity needs to have a connection to the 
past, since it challenges exactly how far the past operates to frame our 
identity, while incorporating the reason why we care about constitutional 
interpretation from the first question.  Most Americans view the Constitution 
as legitimate higher law, provided it evolves to meet current challenges to 
our institutions and our abilities to govern ourselves as autonomous 
individuals.  The second question is also problematic because people will 
often find that they differ, based on their own world views, on which values 
they believe should gain constitutional recognition and how they should be 
prioritized when in conflict with other values.  Phrases like “due process,” 
“equal protection,” or “cruel and unusual punishment” certainly call for 
moral attention at what was earlier described to be a higher-level of concern 
regarding matters of justice and fairness, but exactly what attention needs to 
be afforded to meet the higher-level concern must be carefully scrutinized.  
How the Framers viewed extending these terms to meet various challenges 
may not presumptively mirror what present-day Americans see as necessary, 
or even that all present-day Americans agree on what concerns these terms 
should address.  Although the concept may be the same, its conception need 
not be.125   
IV. Continuity and Change 
The aforementioned urgent desire for continuity in community life 
underlies the continuing authority of constitutional traditions.  Such 
traditions will often look to the past to affirm present action.  To the extent 
that such traditions have goals, or at least attempt to resolve uncertainties, 
they are likely to govern in their wake.  Regardless, majoritarian agreements 
will often operate only in the short-term, especially when new and perhaps 
 
 125.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5 (1971) (footnote omitted) (For example, in 
discussing justice in the context of institutions, John Rawls distinguishes “the concept of justice as 
distinct from the various conceptions of justice and as being specified by the role which . . . these 
different conceptions have in common.”). 
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unexpected concerns arise along with important issues not readily resolvable 
by constitutionally-provided rights or structures.  This itself requires a 
discussion about the effectiveness of existing rights and structures in 
responding to needed and often unexpected changes in daily life, which may 
have been precipitated by technological improvements or significant cultural 
changes.126  In such circumstances, if the background rights and structures 
allow for the needed change to occur, there is no constitutional crisis.127  But 
where the background structures do not readily allow for adjustment in the 
way the community operates, the constitutional tradition must provide for an 
alternative procedure or suffer a loss of legitimacy.128   
Following the procedure in the Article V provision of the United States 
Constitution may be all that is necessary to resolve the challenge.129  
Provisions such as Article V, however, can be clumsy and take a long time 
to achieve results, or even fail to achieve any results because of 
disagreements over what rights and structures should govern based on 
potential interpretations.130  Moreover, there may be a strong desire to see 
how the proposed change would benefit the constitutional system before any 
formal adoption under Article V.  If so, a Supreme Court interpretation that 
precipitates what the proposed amendment would accomplish may provide 
an opportunity to gain the information sought.  More importantly, if the 
change achieves vast support among the populace following the 
interpretation, use of the Article V procedure may not be needed, as the 
change will have become part of the background tradition.  In effect, the 
Article V provision may only be required for implementing changes 
necessary to resolve controversies where there is a current wide division of 
public opinion.  For example, the controversies over slavery that gave rise to 
 
 126.  Alison Frankel, A Supreme Court Case Has Internet Companies Running Scared, 
REUTERS (DEC. 13, 2018, 1:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-halleck-firstamend 
ment/a-supreme-court-case-has-internet-companies-running-scared-idUSKBN1OC2XR (A case 
currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court raises the question:  Can a private company “face 
First Amendment liability as a state actor because they provide a forum for public speech?”  More 
directly, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584, reified an important change in the background culture by 
affording constitutional recognition to same sex marriage.). 
 127.  Separation of Powers - An Overview, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS  
(May 1, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-an-
overview.aspx. 
 128.  FOREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 4 (1985) (Constitutional historian Forrest McDonald points out that, at the time of 
the founding “though virtually every American believed that property and liberty were both natural 
and civil rights, it transpired during the Constitutional Convention that delegates had very different 
understandings of all five of the words set here in italics.”).   
 129.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 130.  STRAUSS, supra note 42, at 19-20. 
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the Civil War were settled only with the adoption of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.131  The point of emphasizing ‘wide division of opinion’ is to 
avoid failing to make important changes, because initially a majority of the 
population may be uncertain whether a change is needed or exactly what the 
change should be.  Thus, the study of constitutional law is a study of not just 
the original document and its amendments, but more importantly, what the 
Constitution requires according to the interpretations of the Supreme Court.   
The above discussion of my two questions should further the 
understanding of the debate between so-called ‘Originalists,’ and those who 
believe in a living Constitution that adapts to new circumstances by way of 
a common law approach.  The former group wants to assert some protection 
against short-term majorities who may unduly trample what is perceived as 
pre-political rights of minorities; the latter group often wants to be able to 
advance protections for those who were previously unprotected.132  These 
schools of thought lack a way to guarantee protections of basic rights while, 
at the same time, allowing for the expansion of existing rights into new, 
previously uncharted, areas.  Still, this is not an insurmountable problem 
because the nature of law itself often provides opportunities to resolve such 
problems.   
One of the most important legal tools is language.  The language of 
legal argument provides a framework for discerning the purposes behind any 
law before the law is applied.  This is shown in Justice Scalia’s example of 
the use of textualism in federal statutory interpretation.  Justice Scalia makes 
the point that “a text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be 
construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it 
fairly means.”133  Justice Scalia uses this method as a basis for his criticism 
of the Court’s holding in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,134 
where a federal statute prohibiting the “importation or migration of any alien 
. . . into the United States . . . under contract or agreement . . . to perform 
labor or service of any kind in the United States” was held not to apply to 
bringing a pastor from England because the Court thought the statute was 
meant to limit only “manual labor.”135  The statute provided an exception for 
“actors, artists, lecturers, and singers,” but the Court did not rely upon any 
of these, making, according to Scalia, Congress’ adoption of these 
 
 131.  See 13th Amendment, HISTORY.COM (May 16, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/ 
black-history/thirteenth-amendment. 
 132.  Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship 
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988). 
 133.  SCALIA, supra note 74, at 23. 
 134.  See Church of the Holy Trinity v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
 135.  Id. at 463. 
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exceptions “utterly inexplicable” if they were not going to limit the statute’s 
application.136  Instead, the Court attempted to look at why the statute was 
enacted.  Since a pastor might have been brought under the exception for 
“lecturers,” this may have been an unnecessary move by the Court.  But even 
if so, it does not follow that Justice Scalia’s inference should prohibit courts 
from ever going beyond the four corners of the statutory language or to 
consider why the statute was adopted.  When deciding a case where statutory 
intent is at stake, it may be necessary to understand what problem the 
Legislature was attempting to resolve.137  Dworkin uses Justice Scalia’s 
example of a person who says, “I admire bays,” and asks: does the person 
“admire certain horses or certain bodies of water”?138  Without some 
investigation into the intent, the correct understanding cannot be ascertained 
from the face value of the words.  Similarly, in legislation, invoking the 
phrase “using a firearm” to enhance the penalty in a criminal statute that 
prohibits trading in illegal drugs could mean “only in situations in which a 
gun is used as a threat” (a likely concern of a legislature), or “in other 
contexts…any purpose including barter.”139  Indeed, Justice Scalia admits 
this need in his Dissenting Opinion in Smith v. United States,140 where the 
Court, in a 6-2 decision, found that the defendant’s offer of an unloaded gun 
in exchange for a quantity of cocaine subjected him to the increased 
penalty.141   
The law also requires the use of deductive and inductive reasoning.142  
A pluralistic society requires “the state act on a single, coherent set of 
principles even when its citizens are divided about what the right principles 
of justice and fairness really are.”143  On questions of principle versus 
policy,144 the understanding of law should be normatively governed by 
 
 136.  Id.  
 137.  See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 373 U.S. 682 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(delving into the legislative history of the federal Religious Freedom and Restoration Act to show 
that Congress’ “purpose was ‘only to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in [Emp. Div., Dep’t 
Hum. Res. Of Org .v.] Smith,’ 394 U.S. 872 (1990), not to “unsettle other areas of the law,” citing 
139 Cong. Rec. 26178 (1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), along with other House and Senate 
documents; see also Vincent J. Samar, Interpreting Hobby Lobby to Not Harm LGBT Civil Rights, 
60 S. D. LAW REV. 457, 462-64 (2015)). 
 138.  Dworkin, supra note 76, at 117. 
 139.  Dworkin, supra note 76, at 117. 
 140.  Id. at 23-24 (citing Smith v. U.S., 508 U.S. 223 (1993)). 
 141.  Id.  
 142.  See HOLMES, supra note 63, at 1, 244 (This author’s use of inductive as well as deductive 
logic is in response to Holmes’ claim that law is not logic, but experience.).   
 143.  RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 166 (1986). 
 144.  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977) (Dworkin had previously 
defined “a policy [as] that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, generally an 
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integrity.  It should hold that “propositions of law are true if they figure in or 
follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process 
that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal 
practice.”145  The requirement that the interpretation should follow from an 
acknowledgement of broader higher law principles seems most present in 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence.  There, distinctions 
involving mostly policies (those that are economically, socially, or 
politically based) and have little effect on an individual’s status, are afforded 
the lowest standard of scrutiny, rational basis review.146  This stands in stark 
contrast to cases involving a more invidious form of discrimination, such as 
classifications based on stereotypes about sex or gender, which requires 
intermediate scrutiny to determine if the state had an important enough 
interest to justify its discriminatory action.147  Cases involving race-based 
classifications require strict scrutiny because the class has suffered a history 
of discrimination inconsistent with the ideals of equal protection, and 
unrelated to the class’ ability to perform.  The class is generally powerless to 
obtain assistance through normal political procedures.148   
Thus, legal interpretation cannot be disconnected from moral 
interpretation.  Although a policy may aim to create a common good (as a 
utilitarian might wish), it still must be justified on moral grounds if its effect 
is to unfairly discriminate amongst those affected by it.  By “moral,” I mean 
those values most essential to society’s existence.  It does not necessarily 
refer to only popular values, although some degree of social awareness 
regarding their importance is necessary.  However, this poses another 
problem: if morals are relevant to an interpretation, which morals are to 
govern any interpretation?  Values associated with particularistic moralities, 
such as religious moralities, are too idiosyncratic to provide the continuity 
 
improvement in some economic, political, or social feature of the community.  He also had defined 
“a ‘principle’ [as] a standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an 
economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice 
or fairness or some other dimension of morality.”  Id.). 
 145.  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE supra note 143 at 225. 
 146.  See, e.g., Nabbia v. N.Y., 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (The Supreme Court applied rational basis 
review to uphold New York’s Milk Control Board’s regulation of milk prices to protect dairy 
farmers, dealers, and retailers.). 
 147.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (The Court required an “exceedingly 
persuasive” justification for Virginia’s Military Academy denial of allowing women into the 
Academy designed to produce “citizen-soldiers.”). 
 148.  See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (applied strict scrutiny to prohibit the 
state from taking a child away from its mother because of an interracial marriage); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (allowing under strict scrutiny the University of Michigan Law 
School to take race into account to achieve the state’s compelling interest in maintaining a diverse 
student body since its individualized admissions process was narrowly drawn). 
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required to hold a pluralistic society together.  Values identified by the 
Framers provide a better starting point: liberty as with due process, equality 
as with equal protection, and various other values, explicitly written into or 
implicitly founded upon the Bill of Rights, such as freedom of expression 
and religious liberty,149 a right to privacy,150 and protections against arbitrary 
arrest or seizure of the person or his effects,151 should play a role, along with 
a right to a fair and speedy trial and to be confronted by witnesses against 
one,152 the right to own property,153 and the right to vote.154  These values 
seem to be universal, and are particularly important for individual well-being 
in a pluralistic society.  The protection against arbitrary arrest is the 
requirement that probable cause be present to believe a crime is being 
committed.   
If all that was being asserted was the presence of a right as object for 
interpretation, there would be less interpretative concern.  Granted, there 
would be a concern if the rights were not explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution and had to be inferred, but this could still be solved through 
appeal, for example, to the Tenth Amendment.155  In law, however, implicit 
rights are affirmed upon close examination of a factual situation where the 
right, as with the line of privacy cases beginning with Griswold v. 
Connecticut, represents an important value in need of constitutional 
protection.  Since this process will likely continue in the future, as new 
situations present new reasons for the recognition of rights, emphasis on how 
unenumerated rights should be identified and what meanings they should 
have become ever more important, just as emphasis on how new structures 
might be adopted to meet changing circumstances also become relevant. 
 
V. Sources of Human Rights 
It was suggested earlier that human rights beyond those found in the 
Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, such as those found in 
international human rights documents the United States has signed onto, may 
 
 149.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 150.  See the line of cases from Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. at 479, to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
at 113. 
 151.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 152.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 153.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 154.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (slavery), XIX (sex), XXIV (age). 
 155.  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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also be good candidates for constitutional attention.156  These rights are not 
self-evident in the Constitution, but are the result of processes designed to 
provide a set of norms across various cultures and societies.  Indeed, the 
antecedents of that process can be traced back “to League of Nations 
institutions that dealt with minority rights and mandated territories;” later, to 
the inclusion of some vague language written into the Charter of the United 
Nations by “smaller countries and nongovernmental organizations . . . for the 
inclusion of an international bill of rights in the Charter.”157  With some 
difficulties along the way, “[i]n time, the membership of the United Nations 
came to accept the proposition that the Charter had internationalized the 
concept of human rights.”158  This opened the door to nation-states like the 
United States being “deemed to have assumed some international obligations 
relating to human rights.”159  Even more important was “the obligation 
imposed by Article 56 on United Nations member states, which required 
them to cooperate with the organization in the promotion of human rights [as 
it] provided the United Nations with the requisite legal authority to embark 
on what became a massive lawmaking effort to define and codify these 
rights.”160  Those rights are now identified in various international 
documents including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
(“UDHR”),161 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) (1966),162 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)(1966).163  These rights are not without 
limitation, as illustrated by the use of reservations by some state signatories 
 
 156.  See, e.g., Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 
368; Int’l Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360.  
See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR (hereinafter 
“UDHR”); see also Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 289 (1965), arguing that many of the 
provisions of the UDHR have come into acceptance as international customary law. 
 157.  Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving International Human Rights System, 100 AM. J. 
INT’L. L. 784-86 (2006) (footnotes omitted). 
 158.  Buergenthal, supra note 157, at 787. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. citing U.N. Charter art. 56, which states: “[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take 
joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes 
set forth in Article 55.”  Article 55 states: “[w]ith a view to the creation of conditions of stability 
and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall 
promote . . . (c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”  Id. 
 161.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR. 
 162.  Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368. 
 163.  Int’l Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1967, 93 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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to these treaties.164  Regardless, the fact that the covenants recite most of the 
rights identified in the Declaration as legally binding gave rise to opinio juris 
and widespread practice to most of the rights listed in the Declaration also 
becoming part of customary international law.165  The question thus to be 
considered here is: should these rights now be considered part of United 
States constitutional law?  Article VI of the United States Constitution 
provides: 
 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the judges 
in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding.166   
 
This was applied in Reid v. Covert,167 in which the Supreme Court 
considered whether a military tribunal might try, under a treaty, a civilian 
dependent for the murder of her military husband in a foreign land.  Noting 
that this would violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, the Court 
found the trial not justified.168  In the language of the Court, 
 
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those 
who created the Constitution, as well as those who were 
responsible for the Bill of Rights—let alone alien to our 
entire constitutional history and tradition—to construe 
Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power 
under an international agreement without observing 
constitutional prohibitions.169 
 
 
 164.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.39/2, 8 I.L.M. 679 (Article 2(1)(d) of the Vienna states that a “’reservation’ means a 
unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, 
accepting, or approving when acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the 
legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that state.”).   
 165.  See Brian D. Lepard, Why Customary International Law Matters in Protecting Human 
Rights, VÖLKERRESCHTSBOG (Feb. 25, 2019), https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/why-customary-intern 
ational-law-matters-in-protecting-human-rights/. 
 166.  U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 167.  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality opinion of Black, J.); see also Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988) (reiterating the Reid standard). 
 168.  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 39-40. 
 169.  Reid, 354 U.S. at 17.  
(DO NOT DELETE) 10/29/2019  10:47 AM 
120 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 47:1 
The Court noted that the reason why treaties were not required under 
Article VI to be made pursuant to the Constitution “was so that agreements 
made by the United States under the Articles of Confederation, including the 
important peace treaties which concluded the Revolutionary War, would 
remain in effect.170  More recently, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court 
held that federal courts are not obligated to take account of UDHR or ICCPR 
when neither the resolutions of ratification nor the treaties themselves 
contain language that they are self-executing.171  Therefore, the Court is 
hesitant to acknowledge enforceable rights in federal or state courts that arise 
under international agreements, unless those rights comport with important 
American values set forth in the Constitution or Bill of Rights.   
Regardless, it is interesting to query, perhaps more so in Sosa than Reid, 
whether the Court could have legitimately required federal courts to take 
account of provisions of the UDHR and ICCPR as being more aligned with 
the Bill of Rights, as representative of the most important human rights 
values of the Constitution.  Absent this solution with the above limitations 
in place, the question of whether such rights exist, at least as an obligation 
of the United States, can no longer be disputed.172  The use of international 
human rights principles in American constitutional law has been discussed 
elsewhere, so this Article will focus solely on how such human rights might 
operate within American constitutional interpretation.173   
But herein also lies a problem.  If international human rights principles, 
regardless of their origin and overarching generality in comparison to 
Articles I and II, are subordinate to those structural limitations, what 
authority can they assert over interpretations of these various powers of 
 
 170.  Id. at 16-17. 
 171.  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734-35 (2004) (footnote omitted) (holding 
“the Declaration does not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international law.”)  
See The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 (quoting 
Eleanor Roosevelt calling the Declaration “’a statement of principles … setting up a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’” and “’not a treaty or international 
agreement … impos[ing] legal obligations’”).  And, although the Covenant does bind the United 
States as a matter of international law, the United States ratified the Covenant on the express 
understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in 
the federal courts.”). 
 172.  In Sosa, the Court acknowledged the possible relevance of the law of nations when it 
stated: “we think courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on 
a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”  Id. at 725.   
 173.  See Vincent J. Samar, Justifying the Use of International Human Rights Principles in 
American Constitutional Law, COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2005) (arguing “that international 
and comparative law sources are relevant to interpreting the U.S. Constitution because the 
Constitution itself warrants respect only insofar as it is a means for achieving minimal protections 
for human dignity”). 
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government?174  If no authority can be asserted, since such principles 
correlate with moral claims, does this mean that morality itself (or at least 
the range of moral obligations beyond what had originally given rise to the 
Constitution) has no place in constitutional interpretation?  Would not such 
a principle in effect undercut a great deal of legitimacy often internationally 
assigned to American constitutional principles, thus reducing its impact on 
the global human rights stage?175  On the other hand, if there is a basis for 
constitutional interpretation to make use of international human rights 
principles, what is that basis and how far does it extend?  The following 
sections will unpack these questions.   
Interestingly, the Court has already acknowledged that international 
human rights has a role to play even with regard to domestic issues.  In 
Lawrence v. Texas,176 for example, the Court overruled its previous holding 
in Bowers v. Hardwick,177 and took note of the Dudgeon decision in the 
European Court of Human Rights.  Five years before Bowers was decided, 
Dudgeon held laws proscribing homosexual conduct in private among 
consenting adults “invalid under the European Convention on Human 
Rights.”178  In effect, the Court suggested that foreign interpretations of 
conventions of human rights that would be similar to those the Supreme 
Court might adopt under the Constitution and Bill of Rights, cannot be 
ignored, even if they are not directly precedential.179  This opens the door to 
an ordering principle for when international human rights principles might 
operate in American constitutional interpretation.  If the application of 
international human rights would provide a similar interpretation to what 
might be provided by a fundamental principle recognized in the United 
States, even though it should add something more, its relevance is at the 
apex, compared to a foreign interpretation at the nadir that seems distant 
 
 174.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (setting forth the powers specifically assigned to Congress) 
and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (setting forth the powers specifically assigned to the President). 
 175.  See Karla Jones, Our Constitutional Principles: America’s Greatest Export, ALEC (Oct. 
18, 2016), https://www.alec.org/article/our-constitutional-principles-americas-greatest-export/. 
 176.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 177.  See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 178.  539 U.S. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. U.K., 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1981)). 
 179.  In Lawrence the Court noted in overruling its earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (which had allowed states to continue to criminalize homosexual conduct) that 
“[o]f even more importance [than The Wolfenden Report: Report of the Committee of Homosexual 
Offenses and Prosecution (1963), which led the British Parliament to repeal many of the offenses 
involving homosexual conduct in its later Sexual Offenses Act 1967, §1, was a decision by the 
European Court of Human Rights, decided five years before Bowers], holding “that the laws 
proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European Convention of Human Rights.” 539 U.S. 
at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1981 & ¶ 52).  
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from the way constitutional values are generally understood.180  This 
perspective on human rights may lessen the belief that the outside 
interpretation fails to satisfy constitutional limitations, and may provide 
more support for it being a consistent development of the changing American 
constitutional landscape.  Indeed, if this analysis had been followed in the 
Sosa case, the Court might have had a different opinion for whether 
international human rights agreements signed onto by the United States 
would apply in federal courts, since the issue there seemed to be more about 
who decides rather than what is decided.  The Constitution has not 
maintained its legitimacy over the years simply by producing a certain kind 
of representative government; rather, its legitimacy is likely based in its 
ability to operate from values that would maintain its cross-generational 
vitality and legitimacy. 
One does not need to be a living constitutionalist to draw out the 
importance of human rights in ongoing American constitutional thought.  
Even if one were an Originalist, there is reason to believe that the Framers 
expected that the institutional structures they created, at times, be in service 
of reconsideration of existing values, and allow for new values, so long as 
they were supported by a majority of Americans.  Had this not been their 
intent, they could have written Article VI’s “Pursuance” clause to apply to 
only treaties made after adoption of the Constitution, all others made 
previously being left enforce having been adopted under the Articles of 
Confederation. 
It follows from what has been said that the language of the Constitution, 
as the supreme law of the land, must therefore be interpreted, and it is the 
responsibility of the Court to carry out that interpretation.  Article III states: 
“[t]he judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme 
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time 
 
 .180  See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Jackson, J. 
concurring), where Justice Jackson affirms an analogous expression for Presidential power.  
Jackson writes: 
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his 
authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all 
that Congress can delegate . . . . 
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he 
can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he 
and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain . . . . 
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. 
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ordain and establish.”181  In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall 
posed the question: 
 
Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to 
say that, in using it, the constitution should not be looked 
into?  That a case arising under the constitution should be 
decided without examining the instrument under which it 
arises?  This is too extravagant to be maintained.182   
 
So, by the Constitution’s sole grant of the judicial power to the federal 
courts, it necessarily leaves to them the primary responsibility of how to 
interpret the Constitution, which would include those human rights 
“[t]reaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States . . . .”183   
VI. Interpretation and Indeterminacy 
This Article has hopefully demonstrated the continued authority of the 
Constitution because the values associated with it, both past and present, 
reflect society’s continuing concern to protect basic human rights in new 
contexts.  Joseph Raz argues that the interpretation of these values cannot 
simply be reduced to reasoning from any single moral value.184  In this 
regard, he noted four considerations that affect the moral merit of the 
Constitution’s institutional role: 
 
First, there is no real theory of constitutional interpretation, 
in the sense of a set of principles that when applied to an 
interpretative question yield the correct interpretation of the 
constitutional provision concerned . . . . Second, there is a 
cogent way of distinguishing between innovative and 
conserving interpretations, and often between more or less 
innovative (less or more conserving) interpretations.  Third, 
interpretation is central to legal reasoning because in legal 
reasoning fidelity to an original competes with, and has to 
be combined with, reasons for innovation . . . . Fourth, it 
makes no sense to ask in general what is the right mix of 
 
 181.  U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 182.  5 U.S. 1 at 179. 
 183.  U.S. CONST. art. VI.   
 184.  RAZ, supra note 118, at 355. 
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conservation and innovation in constitutional 
interpretation.185   
 
These different concerns, especially the third consideration regarding the 
role of the courts, reaches the foreground in the debates between Originalists 
and those who follow a living Constitution approach.  Although the problem 
might be resolved by a suitable justificatory theory of human rights (to be 
discussed in the next section), that itself assumes that the problem of moral 
interpretation is not indeterminate, a position Raz would question.  It also 
presupposes that different considerations might support alternative, 
incommensurable views.  If the moral principles relied upon are themselves 
indeterminate, are the courts truly best equipped to resolve the interpretative 
problem?  Part of the issue here seems to be the unstated need to find an 
answer that can withstand the challenge of moral relativism.186   
This problem finds expression in the area of international human 
rights debates, as Alan Buchanan, for example, has noted:  
 
It is often said that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the various human rights treaties that followed it wisely 
avoided attempting a justification for the norms they asserted.  To 
paraphrase the philosopher Jacques Maritain, it was possible to 
agree on a list of human rights only on the condition that almost 
nothing was said about how they are grounded.187 
 
Buchanan does, however, offer the hopeful possibility that:  
 
In the end, whether a justification becomes available will depend 
not only upon the further development of the moral foundations 
of the idea of human rights—a task which until recently most 
contemporary moral and political philosophers, like most 
international legal theorists, have avoided—but also upon 
improvements in the global public deliberative processes that 
occur within the complex array of institutions within which 
human rights norms are articulated, contested, and revised over 
time.188 
 
 185.  RAZ, supra note 118, at 361. 
 186.  WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS 28 (1906) (Sociologist William Graham 
Sumner wrote in 1906, that “[t]he ‘right’ way is the way which the ancestors used and which has 
been handed down. The tradition is its own warrant.”). 
 187.  ALLEN BUCHANAN, The Legitimacy of International Law in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010). 
 188.  Id. (footnote omitted). 
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In the context of constitutional law, because values are always present, it 
helps to identify the three distinct levels of interpretation where human rights 
values are likely to be implicated.   
The first and most basic level are constitutional norms.  This level 
includes basic principles of human rights that are synonymous with the 
fundamental rights already recognized by the Supreme Court,189 but must be 
able to assimilate other human rights, yet to be recognized, as part of what 
the Constitution affirms.  Recall that a married couple’s right to use 
contraceptives,190 and a single person’s right to the same,191 along with a 
woman’s right to bear or beget a child,192 and a same-sex couple’s right to 
marry,193 were all unknown until the Court recognized a constitutional right 
to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
even then, only over time, was the right to privacy extended to afford 
protection in all three areas.194  Part of the explanation for the time lag is that 
the Court does not offer advisory opinions, but instead waits for an actual 
case or controversy to arise before it affords a resolution.195  In Griswold, the 
time lag also provided the Justices an opportunity to decide where this right 
to privacy might be located in the Constitution, since it is not explicitly 
mentioned in the document.196  Of course, at this first level of interpretation, 
 
 189.  See BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 20 (This level corresponds to what Bobbitt has identified 
as the Supreme Court’s sometimes use of an ethical modality.).   
 190.  Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding for the first time the existence of a 
marital right to privacy to use contraceptives and physicians to advise on their use).  For a broader 
discussion on how the constitutional right to privacy relates to the Fourth Amendment and tort 
protections of privacy, as well as how privacy might be grounded in autonomy, see generally 
VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 51-117 
(1991). 
 191.  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 192.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153 (where the Court settles on the Fourteenth Amendment as 
the basis for the right to privacy); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992).  
 193.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584.  Interestingly, in Obergefell, Justice Kennedy’s 
Majority Opinion holding the right of same-sex marriage to be part of the fundamental right of 
marriage, indicates that his due process analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment was informed 
by the Equal Protection Clause, although he does not say exactly how.  Id. at 2602-03.  For a 
discussion of how these two clauses might be aligned, see Vincent J. Samar, At the Intersection of 
Due Process and Equal Protection: Expanding the Range of Protected Interests, 68 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 87 (2019). 
 194.  See Muskrat v. U.S., 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (The Court has interpreted U.S. CONST. art. III, 
§ 2, cl. 1 to require a real case or controversy, before a decision can be rendered.).   
 195.  See Controversy, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/controversy (last 
visited July 15, 2019). 
 196.  The Justices forming the majority in Griswold disagreed as to whether the right was in 
the penumbra of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, 381 U.S. at 484 (Douglas, 
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decisions may appear somewhat open-ended, though they are not necessarily 
unprincipled.  As will be shown below, a framework guides interpretations 
at this level and is not confined to either Originalism or open to the possible 
indeterminacy that might be characteristic of a common law-like, living 
Constitution approach.   
The second level for interpretation concerns structural matters.  The 
Constitution provides very specific institutional structures for the 
architecture of the federal government, and identifies specific powers each 
branch of that structure—legislative, executive, and judicial—is entitled to 
exercise.197  All other matters are left to be resolved by either Congress or 
the state legislatures.198  Since this level represents the thoughts of the 
Framers to specifically guarantee the protection of liberty, and later, after 
passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, both liberty and equality, it 
bears a presumption of legitimacy under constitutional norms.199  That is to 
say, if the original institutional structures set out by the Framers were thought 
necessary to secure liberty and later to secure both liberty and equality, then 
insofar as these norms remain salient, the structures that support them should 
remain intact.  Consequently, at this level, major changes of structure would 
most likely occur only if there was a significant change in the norms 
supported, and even then, they would likely continue by shifting their 
support to a new set of replacement norms, unless impracticable.  
Consequently, a total demise of these structures would require a 
constitutional amendment following the procedures in Article V.   
Here, it is certainly reasonable to suppose that, at the boundaries where 
structures fail to adequately guarantee constitutional norms, adjustments 
may be needed regarding the way the Constitution is written.  For example, 
the Twelfth Amendment continues the earlier Article II requirement for the 
election of the President and Vice President by a vote of the Electoral 
College.200  It added the requirement that the Electors designate who they 
were voting for President from whom they were selecting as Vice President.  
This was to prevent a future election from occurring, like the 1800 election 
between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr that was forced into the United 
States House of Representatives because both candidates received the same 
 
J. plurality); or in the Ninth Amendment reservation of rights “retained by the people,” Id. at 499 
(Goldberg, J. concurring); or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Id. at 500 (Harlan, J. concurring). 
 197.  See generally U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III.  
 198.  See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 199.  See BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 13, 4 (Bobbitt’s historical and textual modalities fit within 
this second level of interpretation provided the institutions are able to function adequately to 
guarantee the protection of constitutional norms.).   
 200.  Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XII (1804) with id. art. II, §1, cl. 3 (1789).   
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number of electoral votes, notwithstanding that the electors themselves had 
intended Jefferson to be President and Burr to be Vice President.201   
The third level for constitutional interpretation concerns innovations to 
meet changing social conditions.  Thomas Jefferson had suggested the need 
to adapt the Constitution to meet changing circumstances, without referring 
to the amendment process.202  In an important letter to Samuel Kercheval, in 
1816, seven years after serving as President, Jefferson wrote: 
 
I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes 
in laws and constitutions.  I think moderate imperfections had 
better be borne with; because when once known, we 
accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical means of 
correcting their ill effects.  But I know also, that laws and 
institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human 
mind.  As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as 
new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners 
and opinions change, with the change of circumstances, 
institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. 
We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which 
fitted him when he a boy, as civilized society to remain ever 
under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.203   
 
The progress anticipated by Jefferson arrived a century later with the 
advent of the Great Depression and the rise of the regulatory state in which 
Congress delegated some of its legislative authority to specific agencies to 
make rules to protect individuals’ economic and social well-being.204  Three 
examples are presented for illustration.  In 1913, Congress created the 
Federal Reserve System to make monetary policy and to supervise banking 
by transferring some of its constitutional authority, “[t]o coin Money [and] 
regulate the Value thereof,” to a Board that would oversee private baking in 
 
 201.  See Amendment XII in The Constitution of the United States: Analysis and Interpretation, 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/constitution-annotated/ (last visited June 14, 
2019). 
 202.  Letter to Samuel Kercheval, Monticello, July 12, 1816, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 90, at 674. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  5.1 Administrative Agencies: Their Structures and Powers in INTRODUCTION TO THE 
LAW OF PROPERTY, ESTATE PLANNING AND INSURANCE, https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_intro 
duction-to-the-law-of-property-estate-planning-and-insurance/s08-01-administrative-agencies-the 
ir-.html (last visited June 14, 2019). 
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the United States.205  In 1933, Congress adopted the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act “to stabilize production in agriculture by offering subsidies to farmers to 
limit their crops.”206  Although the Act would eventually be held 
unconstitutional as a violation of the Tenth Amendment, the Court in that 
case adopted a view previously set forth by Alexander Hamilton “that 
Congress could tax and spend for any purpose that it believed served the 
general welfare, so long as Congress did not violate another constitutional 
provision.”207  The following year, the Court upheld Congress’ creation of 
the Social Security Act under its broad taxing and spending authority.208   
Were these violations of Article I’s statement, “[A]ll legislative Powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall 
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives[?]”209  A key question 
surrounding the Tenth Amendment is whether it provides “a judicially 
enforceable limit on Congress’s powers.”210  The Court has at times 
vacillated, sometimes finding that “the Tenth Amendment is not a separate 
constraint on Congress, but rather, is simply a reminder that Congress only 
may legislate if it has authority under the Constitution.”211  At other times, 
the Court has found “that the Tenth Amendment protects state sovereignty 
from federal intrusion.”212  Surely, at the time it was adopted ,changes in the 
economies of other countries did not so clearly and often implicate changes 
in the United States economy.213  Given the uncertainty of the future, is it 
reasonable to suppose that the Framers meant to create a Constitution and 
Bill of Rights that would be frozen by its structures to only being able to 
meet then current social and economic conditions?214  Surely, Jefferson, who 
 
 205.  U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 5; see Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. 63-43, ch. 6, 38 
Stat. 251 (1913), amend. 1933 Banking Act, Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162.   
 206.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 274 (3d ed. 
2006) (citing U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 207.  CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, supra note 206, at 
274 (citing Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-66 (1935)). 
 208.  See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).  Note: Bobbitt’s structural and 
prudential modalities can be seen to play an important role here.  See BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 14, 
15, 16. 
 209.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1. 
 210.  CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, supra note 206, at 
312. 
 211.  Id. at 313. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  See M. Ayhan Kose, Csilla Lakatos, Franziska Ohnsorge, & Marc Stocker, 
Understanding the Global Role of the U.S. Economy, VOX CEPR POLICY PORTAL (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://voxeu.org/article/understanding-global-role-us-economy. 
 214.  In Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 43 (1825), Chief Justice Marshall distinguished 
“important subjects,” which must be entirely regulated by Congress from “mere details,” the latter 
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perceived himself to be a constitutional strict constructionist, did not think 
so, as he himself went ahead with the Louisiana Purchase when that 
unexpected opportunity came his way during his presidency.215   
Granted, there is always the Article V amendment route.  However, that 
approach is very time-consuming and may elicit concerns outside of the 
immediate subject matter.216  If the Constitution created a government that 
would endure, then one duty for the Supreme Court would be to check on 
whether a change in interpretation of some provision of the Constitution was 
necessary to the overall well-being of the United States as prescribed in the 
Preamble, and was not specifically violative of any other provision.  
Moreover, if anyone might worry that allowing such changes might be too 
dangerous to liberty, consider Professor Ackerman’s point, that the third 
republic of the United States—the one that began with Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s New Deal—was approved by a significant number of Americans 
who elected and re-elected this Democratic president, and also provided him 
in his first re-election a decisive Democratic majority in Congress that would 
eventually lead to “the recognition by all three branches that the People had 
spoken.”217   
VII. Affirming Human Rights  
Up to this point, the priority for constitutional interpretation has been to 
promote constitutional norms, especially those affording fundamental 
human rights, while also allowing for the possibility that the set of norms 
might be expanded or adjusted as to their relevant scope or contents to meet 
changing circumstances, so long as they do not become too distant from 
existing norms.  Secondarily, constitutional interpretation was to keep in 
place the basic institutional structures created by the Framers, provided these 
 
of which Congress could delegate.  In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989), the 
Supreme Court applied an “intelligible principle” test that required Congress to clearly delineate 
the public policy it was applying and the boundaries of the delegated authority.”  In Chevron v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984), the Court held that since Congress did not 
express a clear intention when it used the phrase “statutory source” in the Clean Air Act, the 
agency’s construction of the term “source” was a reasonable policy choice that must be given 
deference.  See also Ganesh Sitaraman, Our Constitution Wasn’t Built for This, N.Y. TIMES 
OPINION (Sept. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/16/opinion/sunday/constitution-
economy.html. 
 215.  See Adam Kloppe, The Louisiana Purchase and the Constitutionalism of Thomas 
Jefferson, MISSOURI HISTORICAL SOCIETY (Mar. 17, 2015), https://mohistory.org/blog/the-
louisiana-purchase-and-the-constitutionalism-of-thomas-jefferson/. 
 216.  See The Amendment Process: Adding a New Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, Not An Easy Task, HARRY S. TRUMAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/teacher_lessons/3branches/15b.htm. 
 217.  See ACKERMAN, supra note 95, at 110-11. 
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structures should continue to serve constitutional norms generally, and to 
make further adjustments by way of the Article V amendment process.  
Lastly, constitutional interpretation was to allow for innovation in the 
creation of new governmental agencies to meet changing conditions that 
could not have been foreseen by the Framers, but which Congress could 
institute if approved by the federal courts.   
Thus, the important matter of indeterminacy, raised in the previous 
section, must now be discussed to ensure that additions and adjustments to 
underlying constitutional norms or innovations to the structures not just be 
“code” for simply bending to the will of the current legislative majority.  The 
concern in both these instances is to protect important constitutional norms, 
since the structures exist in order to support and guarantee these norms.218  
Consequently, at the constitutional level, what matters is finding some 
criteria to determine which additional norms or changes to norms are 
legitimate, and how to determine what weight they should be afforded.  The 
importance of this question must not be understated, since implicit in the 
answer will be the way the whole constitutional framework operates.  Values 
are the key, and so determining which values and what weight to afford them 
is all important.  This is also at the core of the debate between Originalists 
and those who subscribe to a living Constitution.  It was also implicit in 
Buchanan’s concern that the nations that agreed to recognize a set of 
international human rights only did so because there was no justification for 
their foundation.  That problem now needs to be solved specifically 
regarding how American constitutional interpretation may move forward.219   
The approach to be adopted here to resolve the problem of 
indeterminacy relies on the work of the American moral philosopher, Alan 
Gewirth.  In Reason and Morality,220 Gewirth lays a foundation for a 
consistent set of human rights that do not beg any question and can operate 
together.221  He does this by searching for a moral principle that might 
underlie such rights.  He begins by taking note of the various failed attempts 
throughout history to provide a non-question begging, adequate justification 
 
 218.  THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) (In Federalist 39, James Madison makes clear 
the norms that would govern the republican government established by the Convention.).  
 219.  Elsewhere, this issue is discussed in the context of grounding a set of international human 
rights.  See Samar, supra note 173, at 40-63. 
 220.  ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978). 
 221.  Id. at 21. 
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for a human rights principle, including intuitionism,222 institutionalism,223 
interests,224 intrinsic worth of human beings,225 and John Rawls’ approach of 
searching for such rights behind a veil of ignorance where representative 
persons do not know any particular facts about themselves, but only know 
general facts concerning human motivation, as might be found from the 
study of psychology or economics.226  Since all of these approaches fail to 
provide a determinate justification for moral rights, Gewirth instead uses as 
his starting point what lies behind any moral rights claim that an agent might 
make.  Note that at this point Gewirth focuses on individual claims, not 
institutional claims, although what he ultimately arrives at can be applied to 
institutions in the same way as it is applied to individuals, especially the 
institution of law.  Gewirth remarks that: 
 
Amid the immense variety of [practical] precepts [that set 
requirements for human action], they have in common that the 
intention of the persons who set them forth is to guide, advise, or 
urge the persons to whom they are directed so that these latter 
 
 222.  Id. at 14.  Gewirth’s response to arguments based on intuition points out that “[a]ccording 
to the Declaration of Independence, the unalienable rights of man include life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness; yet Jefferson accepted the legitimacy of capital punishment, imprisonment, 
and military conscription.  If no qualifications are introduced, two complementary things must be 
said about the relation between the ideal rights and the actual laws: not only is the relation between 
these not one of deduction, but they appear to conflict with one another unless modifying 
considerations are provided.”  Id. at 280. 
 223.  Id. at 27 (pointing out that “[t]he primary morality, in this view, is that of ‘my station and 
its duties’ as derived from the requirements of groups, so that a person is an ‘assemblage of roles:’ 
husband, father, voter, taxpayer, carpenter, union member, proletarian, buyer, bowling-team 
captain, or more generally a member of some national, religious, ethnic, or racial group or economic 
class, and so forth.”)  
 224.  Gewirth notes “[i]t is sometimes argued that because all persons equally have certain 
needs or desires, it follows that all persons ought equally to have the means of satisfying these 
needs or desires.  Entirely apart from the gap here between ‘is’ and ‘ought, there is the further 
difficulty that . . . [inegalitarian ideals] . . . should all be given equal weight.”  Id. at 18-19. 
 225.  Here, Gewirth notes that “[i]n the classic formulation of Thomas Aquinas’s natural law 
theory, there are only two morally right modes of derivation: human laws must be derivable from 
natural law either by deduction or specification.  In the first way human law’s prohibition of murder 
is derived from natural law’s prohibition of inflicting evil on other persons; in the second way 
human law’s specification of the death penalty for evildoing is derived from natural law’s 
prescription that evildoers be punished.  The trouble with this simple way of relating natural law to 
human law is that it does not serve to explain the seeming conflicts between the two kinds of law” 
as, e.g., if the punishment is death.  Id. (footnote omitted). 
 226.  GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220 (stating that “the veil of ignorance, 
in addition to its obvious non-rational (because noncognitive) features, is, like the assumption of 
original equality, a way of removing from [representative persons] the rational choosers’ 
consideration certain factors, consisting in their actual empirical inequalities and dissimilarities, 
that together with their self-interest would strongly influence them to make inegalitarian choices”). 
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persons will more or less reflectively fashion their behavior along 
the lines indicated in the precepts.  Hence, it is assumed that the 
hearers can control their behavior through their unforced choice 
as to try to achieve the prescribed ends or contents, although they 
may also intentionally refrain from complying with the precepts.  
From this it follows that action, in the strict sense that is relevant 
to moral and other practical precepts, has two interrelated generic 
features: voluntariness or freedom and purposiveness or 
intentionality.227 
 
Together, these two generic features of action that underlie all moral 
and practical precepts (including constitutional precepts) provide for 
Gewirth an independent ground for a moral principle from which human 
rights can be derived.  Since the analysis for his grounding of human rights 
is not restricted to any particular institutional arrangement nor limited by any 
particular religious or cultural precondition, its use, especially when 
combined with American historical considerations,228 should be of great help 
 
 227.  Id. at 26-27. Contra Raz, Human Rights Without Foundations in PHILOSOPHY OF INT’L 
LAW, 324 (Joseph Raz misconstrues Gewirth’s justification for human rights when he claims first, 
that “[Gewirth] ignores the possibility of believing that certain conditions are essential to our life, 
and even of striving to secure such conditions, without either claiming or having a right to them” 
and second, by stating that Gewirth believes “that there is a general (overridable) right to freedom 
because ‘freedom is a necessary condition of purposive action’—a claim which is evidently false 
if it means that, for instance, slaves cannot act purposively.”  Id.  Raz’s first criticism misconstrues 
Gewirth’s claim that all human actions, insofar as they are purposive, presuppose some pro-attitude 
or value under which they are undertaken.  To deny this would be to contradict oneself.  Regarding 
Raz’s second criticism, Gewirth’s states that “freedom and well-being (with their bases in 
voluntariness and purposiveness, respectively), can be distinguished from one another as entering 
into the general context of action…. Freedom involves a procedural aspect of actions in that it 
concerns the way actions are controlled as ongoing events.  Well-being, on the other hand, while 
also having a procedural aspect, involves the substantive aspect of actions, the specific contents of 
these events.”  ALAN GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT 112 (1998).  Certainly, no one would consider 
the slave who acts on behest of his master to be acting truly voluntarily.).  
 228.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Anti-Federalists, who are credited with getting the Bill of 
Rights adopted, contradictorily “favored both government encouragement of religion and liberty of 
individual conscience.”  HERBERT STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 64 (1981).  In 1779, Thomas 
Jefferson drafted what would eventually become The Virginia Act for Establishing Religious 
Freedom (1786), which clearly spoke to freedom of conscience and delineated a separation of 
church and state. See Thomas Jefferson and the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, VIRGINIA 
MUSEUM FOR HISTORY AND CULTURE, https://www.virginiahistory.org/collections-and-
resources/virginia-history-explorer/thomas-jefferson (last visited June 25, 2019).  Later he would 
write to the Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, on Jan. 1, 180: “I contemplate . . . 
building a wall of separation between Church and State.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bap 
tists_in_the_history_of_separation_of_church_and_state (last visited June 25, 2019).  U.S. CONST. 
art. VI, § 3 provides: “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or 
public Trust under the United States.”   
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in delineating which rights best fit the American constitutional framework.  
Indeed, as it turns out, because the theory also affords criteria for the 
resolution of conflicts of rights, it should also be of help in resolving the 
problem of indeterminacy.   
This is how the derivation proceeds.  When an agent (i.e., an actor) 
practically performs an action, her thinking can be expressed linguistically 
as “I choose to do X for purpose E,” or more simply, “I do X for purpose 
E.”229  If the agent is rational, then from her standpoint, dialectically, “E is 
good” is a claim that can be associated to her qua agent.230  This is true even 
where the action is arbitrarily chosen and has no moral, legal, or prudential 
worth.231  From this it follows, the agent values her voluntariness or freedom 
without which she could not act,232 and her purposiveness or well-being 
without which she could not achieve the goal for which she acts.233  Well-
being can be separated into three levels.  Basic well-being is the precondition 
without which one could not act such as life, physical integrity and mental 
equilibrium.234  Non-subtractive well-being includes the condition for 
maintaining one’s current level of purpose fulfillment, which is undermined 
when one is lied to, defrauded or a promise is broken.235  Additive well-being 
is the condition required for increasing one’s level of purpose fulfillment;236 
these include adequate health care, a minimal living wage, and education.237  
Thus, because freedom and well-being are necessary to an agent doing X for 
purpose E, from the agent’s point of view, she logically claims rights to these 
generic goods by her very actions.238  Indeed, if she were to deny “I have 
rights to freedom and well-being,” the agent would also have to deny “all 
other persons ought at least to refrain from interfering with my freedom and 
well-being” because rights, in the relevant sense here, are correlative with 
duties.239  This would lead to a contradiction if she also accepts “My freedom 
and well-being are necessary goods,” which the agent must accept; “for by 
virtue of regarding [her] purposes as good the agent must also a fortiori value 
[her] freedom and well-being, as required for achieving any of [her] 
 
 229.  GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 42, 49 (1978). 
 230.  GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 44, 49. 
 231.  Id. at 51, 75-76. 
 232.  See id. at 52. 
 233.  See id. at 53-54. 
 234.  See id. at 54. 
 235.  See id. at 54-56, 233. 
 236.  GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 56. 
 237.  See id. at 240, 243-44. 
 238.  See id. at 63-64.  
 239.  Id. at 80. 
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purposes.”240  However, “the objects to which the agent necessarily claims 
rights are only those goods that are truly necessary for [her] action or [her] 
successful action in general;” it would not include, for example, “I must have 
a motorcycle.”241   
Up to this point, Gewirth has succeeded only in establishing that any 
agent qua agent must logically claim, from her own internal conative 
standpoint, rights to the generic and necessary conditions of her action.  This 
prudential standard is different from a moral standard.  “Morality . . .  is 
primarily concerned with interpersonal actions, that is, with actions that 
affect persons other than their agents.”242  Thus, to advance the agent’s claim 
to a moral level, Gewirth must further establish a moral principle in which 
all other prospective purposive agents “logically must acknowledge certain 
generic obligations.  Negatively, [s]he ought to refrain from coercing and 
from harming [her] recipients; positively, [s]he ought to assist them to have 
freedom and well-being whenever they cannot otherwise have these 
necessary goods and [s]he can help them at no comparable cost to 
[her]self[.]”243  That principle, which Gewirth calls the Principle of Generic 
Consistency (“PGC”) is a “categorical” moral principle.244  It states: “[a]ct 
in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as yourself.245  
The way he reaches this moral standard is as follows.   
The agent’s prudential claim gives rise to a moral claim because “‘I 
have rights to freedom and well-being’ entails ‘All other persons ought to 
respect my freedom and well-being.’”246  And since any agent can make this 
same claim for the sufficient justifying reason of just being an agent, it can 
be universalized to “[a]ll prospective purposive agents have rights to 
freedom and well-being.”247  Thus, although the PGC was derived 
dialectically and cannot be separated from its dialectical linkage, Gewirth is 
able to assert, that the principle, now standing by itself, requires that “every 
agent logically must accept that [s]he ought to act in accord with the generic 
rights of [her] recipients as well as [her]self.”248  The latter follows from the 
fact that “[t]he PGC is a product not of ignorance, but rather of rational 
awareness of what logically follows from being an agent, so that its 
 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id. at 82 (italics added). 
 242.  GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 129. 
 243.  Id.at 135. 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  Id.at 135. 
 246.  Id. at 146. 
 247.  Id. at 147. 
 248.  GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 155. 
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obligatoriness is not overcome, but rather is established and reinforced by 
rational understanding of its basis.”249   
Additionally, the PGC affirms positive as well as negative rights.  “The 
negative rights require that limitations not be imposed by social conventions 
or political power on persons’ ability to aspire realistically to whatever goals 
their inherent capacities may render feasible . . . .”250  “The positive rights 
require social arrangements whereby persons are helped to develop their 
abilities of aspiration-fulfillment so long as they cannot do so by their own 
efforts.”251  For purposes of this article, acknowledging the logical grounding 
of the PGC as a non-question begging standard for morality identifies what 
human rights exist, along with how conflicts among these rights are 
rationally resolved.  The distinction between identifying which rights are 
human rights and showing how conflicts among these rights are resolved can 
now be set forth. 
Because the PGC derives from the conviction that any agent would 
logically have to acknowledge on pain of contradiction that she has rights to 
freedom and well-being,252 and because all human beings capable of 
voluntary purposive action are, at least, prospective agents,253 it follows that 
the PGC can provide a baseline for determining human rights whether or not 
present in the Constitution or in international documents generally.254  The 
baseline calls attention to the fact that the rights exist by virtue of their being 
necessary for prospective purposive agency, regardless of whether there is a 
need for their actualization at the moment or even whether the need can be 
fulfilled.255  This is particularly important in relation to social arrangements.  
Remember, it is not a specific claim to freedom or well-being, as the earlier 
motorcycle example represents, that the PGC protects, but what an agent qua 
agent would necessarily have to claim merely by being an agent.  Here, is 
where more specific human rights may get instantiated as necessary for the 
continuation of human beings as prospective purposive agents.  It is here also 
that the rights to freedom and well-being may apply to guide answers to 
situations where purposive agency in general would otherwise be 
 
 249.  Id. at 156. 
 250.  GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT, supra note 227, at 94. 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  See GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 103. 
 253.  See id. at 141.  Elsewhere, I discuss the situation of infants, very young children, and the 
fetus.  See generally Vincent J. Samar, Personhood Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 MARQ. 
L. REV. 287 (2017). 
 254.  See GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 64 (noting that the generic 
rights “are ‘human rights’ in that they are rights that all humans have as human agents”).  
 255.  Id. at 317.  
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threatened.256  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights257 generally, 
along with the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,258 and the Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights259 (discussed above260) in 
particular, provide good examples of where states should be expected to 
assure the protection of these rights.  The former is aimed at providing 
individual freedom and protection from coercive practices by governments 
that do not try to protect human rights.  The latter is aimed at supporting 
well-being to the extent the governments in question have the resources 
necessary to render that support.  The Kantian requirement that Ought 
implies Can governs the application of the latter covenant.261  The same 
could be said for other covenants the various members of the United Nations 
adopt to support human rights.262  It also fits our earlier discussion of values 
that motivated the Framers’ adoption of the Bill of Rights, especially the 
value of guaranteeing freedom from the possibility of an oppressive and 
coercive government.  A similar argument could be made for the value of 
equality that motivated the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
especially in the context of assuring former slaves’ privileges and 
 
 256.  An argument for the derivation of specific human rights from a more general moral 
standard and from there an even more specific set of gay rights can be found at Vincent J. Samar, 
Gay Rights as a Particular Instantiation of Human Rights, 64 ALBANY L. REV. 983 (2001). 
 257.  217 (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 258.  Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 
368. 
 259.  Int’l Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1967, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 260.  Section 5, supra. 
 261.  IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 473(Norman Kemp Smith trans., 
MacMillon and Co., Ltd., 2d ed. 1929) (1781).  
 262.  See, e.g., Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 U.N.T.S. 253, as amended by Protocol 
Amending Slavery Convention, Dec. 7, 1953, 182 U.N.T.S. 51; Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Convention on Decent Work 
for Domestic Workers, June 16, 2011, ILO No. 189; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 
U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 6 I.L.M. 78; Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 350 (CERD); G.A. 
Res. 3068 (XXVIII), Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
(Nov. 30, 1973); Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; G.A. 
Res. 54/263, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222 (May 25, 2000); Protocol on the Sale of Children, 
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. A/Res/54/263 (2000); Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 
(CEDAW); G.A. Res. 46 (XXXIX) 1984) annex, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel and 
Inhuman Degrading Treatment of Punishment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (Dec. 10, 1984), 
as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (Oct. 23, 1985); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3, (U.S. signed but not ratified); and International Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Dec. 20, 2006, 2715 U.N.T.S. 
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immunities as citizens of the United States and states where they lived.263  
Here, one sees that the value of equality not only guarantees equal freedom 
but also, when considered in context of opportunities, affords the same legal 
opportunities other citizens possess.264  Obviously, historical examples that 
would illustrate this development took many decades,265 and the extension 
of these rights to other groups did not happen quickly, which included 
women,266 illegitimate children,267 and gays and lesbians.268  Thus, this 
historical development is consistent with what the PGC requires as a 
grounding principle to protect freedom and well-being of all persons. 
Having thus shown the PGC can identify specific human rights, the 
question that must now be considered is, what purpose might it serve in cases 
of conflicts of rights?  It may be helpful to note how the different levels of 
well-being discussed above allow for two ways to resolve conflicts of rights 
among individuals.  Where the conflict is at the same level, as when an 
aggressor uses his freedom to attack a basic right to well-being of his 
recipient, the PGC recognizes a transactional inconsistency created by the 
aggressor’s implicit claim that his rights are more valuable than his 
recipient’s.269  In that instance, the recipient, whose rights are the same as 
the aggressor because both are prospective purposive agents, can 
 
 263.  In Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. at 429, the Court struck down a state court’s order denying 
a mother custody of her child because she married a man of a different race.  In that case, Chief 
Justice Burger wrote: “[a] core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all 
governmentally imposed discrimination based on race,” effectively knocking out any use of race to 
gain a privilege under the law.  Id. at 432. 
 264.  See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. at 432. 
 265.  In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 537, the Court upheld a Louisiana law that mandated 
“separate but equal facilities” on railroad cars for blacks and whites, a judgement that would later 
be implicitly overruled in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. at 483, when the Court held 
segregation in the public schools to be unconstitutional.  Importantly, in that decision Chief Justice 
Warren’s opinion began by explaining that the constitutionality of the issue of segregation could 
not be resolved based on the Framers’ intent because the historical sources “[a]t best…are 
inconclusive” and did not fit the way education of whites in the South had changed from originally 
being in the hands of private groups.  Id. at 489-90.  The Court then took note of the recent fact that 
“'[s]egregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the 
colored children” especially “when it has the sanction of the law.”  Id. at 494. 
 266.  See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (where the Supreme Court applied intermediate 
scrutiny for gender classifications); see also U.S. v. Va. Military Acad., 518 U.S. at 515. 
 267.  See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding unconstitutional a state statute 
that required only the consent of the mother and not the father to place for adoption a child born 
out-of-wedlock). 
 268.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 558 (upholding a due process liberty right for same-
sex intimate associations); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. at 2071 (holding that the 
fundamental right to marry includes the right to a same-sex marriage). 
 269.  See GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 213. 
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legitimately protect herself, even by the use of deadly force if warranted.270  
In short, self-defense is morally justified.271  On the positive side, because 
“the agent necessarily holds that [s]he has a right to the basic goods that are 
necessary preconditions of action, so [s]he must hold that other persons also 
have this basic right.”272  This gives rise to a positive duty to help where, for 
example, one might be drowning, and the potential rescuer could save the 
person at no comparable costs to herself.273  Both examples illustrate “the 
entitlements to the goods of the parties affected, as ascertained by the 
consideration of equal rights to the necessary conditions of agency.”274  But 
what about cases where the conflict may not involve basic or even the same 
level of well-being but loss, for example, of some non-subtractive well-being 
in order to preserve basic well-being?275  In that instance, the degree of 
needfulness of action must be taken into account.276  As with the duty to 
rescue, where the harm is especially great to purpose fulfillment, the duty to 
prevent the harm takes on greater significance.277  An obvious historical 
example would be lying to the Gestapo about where the Jewish family might 
be hiding to prevent their being murdered.  Although the lie lowers the level 
of the Gestapo’s non-subtractive well-being to fulfill their purposes, because 
their purposes are to destroy basic rights of innocent people, one is morally 
permitted to lie and, if one can do so at no comparable harm to oneself, the 
lie is obligatory.278 
But the story does not end here.  The larger issue, and the issue for this 
Article, is how these criteria might operate to provide grounds for 
interpretation of the United States Constitution and laws, both of which will 
likely implicate human rights.  In this regard, it is worth noting that the PGC 
applies to institutions indirectly.279  This is especially important to note, since 
“social rules [that ‘involve complex interactions among many persons’] may 
require that agents [sometimes] violate the PGC’s direct applications.”280  
 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  Id. at 217. 
 273.  See GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 217-19. 
 274.  Id. at 216. 
 275.  Id. at 236. 
 276.  Gewirth had earlier noted: “The loss of dispositional or long-range freedom, such as by 
imprisonment or enslavement, makes all or most purposive action impossible, while to lose some 
occurrent or particular freedom debars one from some particular action but not from all actions.”  
Id. at 52. 
 277.  See id. at 236-37. 
 278.  See id. at 237; see also GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT, supra note 227, at 90. 
 279. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 272. 
 280. Id. at 272-73. 
(DO NOT DELETE) 10/29/2019  10:47 AM 
Fall 2019] RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 139 
Also, “associations regulated by social rules” allow for “relatively stable, 
standardized arrangement . . . that is socially approved on the ground 
(whether justified or unjustified) of its value to society.”281  In the case of the 
democratic state, the freedom component of the PGC is met when the law 
depends on rational consent through the frameworks of the PGC.282  Thus, 
consensual procedures are required to operate within the constitutional 
structure at four distinct levels: “(1) the minimal state with the criminal law, 
(2) the supportive state with its need for other laws and officials, (3) its 
constitutional structure providing for certain consensual decision-
procedures, [and] (4) the specific laws and officials determined by use of 
these procedures.”283   
“The main point of this constitutional determination by the PGC 
consists of the equal distribution of the civil liberties.”284  These include 
“especially the actions of speaking, publishing, and assembling and 
associating with others.”285  The method of consent, however, “cannot rightly 
transgress the constitution which, through the PGC provides its justification 
as a procedure whose results are binding.” provided the Constitution itself is 
morally justified by the PGC.286  For that to be the case, the Constitution 
“must require that there be equal freedom to participate in the political 
process for all members of the society, so that the civil liberties must  
be equally preserved for all.”287  Here it is important to note: 
 
[T]he equality of political participation that [the method of 
consent] makes possible may be more formal than real.  In 
particular, differences of economic power may strongly influence 
the degree of effectiveness with which different persons and 
groups participate in the political process.  Hence, with a view to 
the equality of generic rights, it is a matter of great importance 
what steps are to be taken to ensure that other serious harms are 
not inflicted by those who are superior in economic or other power 
on those who are inferior in these respects, and that the 
opportunities available to the latter for obtaining well-being are 
more nearly equalized.288 
 
 281.  Id. at 274. 
 282.  Id. at 304-06. 
 283. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 306. 
 284.  Id. at 307. 
 285.  Id. at 308. 
 286.  Id. at 310. 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Id. at 311. 
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The requirement that real consent not be undermined by differences in 
economic power or other power opens the door to the application of the well-
being component of the PGC to institutions of the state in order to correct 
problems of inequality wherever they may surface. 
What distinguishes the minimal state from the supportive state is the 
fact that it is no longer sufficient to merely protect basic and non-subtractive 
well-being, as had been the case when Lochner v. New York was decided.289  
Now the claim is more robust.  For human rights to flourish, certain 
grounding conditions represented by the PGC’s additive goods will be 
necessary for the exercise and advancement of human self-fulfillment.  An 
example of these grounding conditions was the Court’s willingness to accept 
the constitutionality of New Deal legislation following the Great Depression 
of the 1930s.  The purpose of this legislation was to ensure the economic and 
social survival of the society.290  These grounding conditions will only 
achieve their goal of ensuring social well-being, however, if the rules by 
which they are administered have three kinds of content: 
 
First, they must provide for supplying basic goods, such as food 
and housing, to those who cannot obtain them by their own efforts.  
Second, they must try to rectify inequalities of additive well-being 
by improving the capabilities for productive work of persons who 
are deficient in this respect.  Education is a prime means of such 
improvement, but also important is whatever strengthens family 
life and enables parents to give constructive, intelligent, loving 
nurture to their children.  The wider diffusion of such means is a 
prime component of increasing equality of opportunity.  Third, the 
rules must provide for various public goods that, while helping all 
the members of the society, serve to increase the opportunities for 
productive employment. 291 
 
These rules, which the PGC provides for determining the structure of 
the supportive state, must in the first instance govern the Legislative Branch, 
 
 289.  See ACKERMAN, supra note 95, at 15 (“Courts of the Lochner era hedged their libertarian 
principles with a number of exceptions, including one involving ‘protection of public morals’” so 
even the limited libertarian principles were not always followed.).   
 290.  See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. at 399 (upholding a minimum wage law for 
women and, in effect, expanding the government’s power to regulate beyond public safety, heath, 
or morals to now encompass “[t]he exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position 
with respect to bargaining power and thus relatively defenseless against the denial of as living wage 
. . .”). 
 291.  GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 220, at 314. 
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since it is that branch which has the constitutional authority to bring these 
contents into reality.  Although there may be disagreement as to the best way 
to bring about these conditions, so long as the methods chosen are reasonable 
in that they do not violate other basic rights (as might be present in other 
constitutional provisions), they should be constitutionally allowed.  This is 
true even if the methods should require innovations, such as the creation of 
new agencies to resolve complex social and economic problems.  The role 
of the courts in these circumstances is to prevent only unreasonable 
restrictions on the Legislature’s ability to do its job.  That means that 
challenges concerning legislative overreach, for instance, as with Congress 
mandating health care or minimum wage requirements, must be closely 
reviewed and not held invalid, so long as the needs are real and the legislative 
choices are consistent with constitutional and human rights concerns.  As 
noted earlier, the Constitution’s legitimacy draws its authority from how well 
the structures and norms that were adopted at the time of ratification continue 
to fit with whatever adjustments or additions might be appropriate for 
today’s moral understanding of the proper governance of the state.  
VIII.  Human Dignity 
So far, this discussion has focused on the role that human rights 
ought to play in constitutional interpretation.  But what does this mean for 
human dignity, which, as explained below, has already been recognized as 
an important constitutional value?  One might begin explaining human 
dignity by distinguishing “self-respect,” as a realistic assessment of having 
satisfied one’s moral obligations, from “self-esteem,” which is an 
affirmation of one’s specific abilities to fulfill one’s own desires or goals.  
The latter might include following a personalist morality beyond what 
human rights requires.292  Dignity then, as a moral virtue, represents the self-
respect one has for oneself, and the respect one deserves from others for 
satisfying reasonable moral obligations as would be required by a system of 
universal morality, such as is offered by the PGC.293  Exactly how dignity 
and universal morality are implicated in constitutional interpretation, 
however, now needs explanation. 
First, it should be noted “that dignity is a humanistic characteristic.”294  
As Gewirth points out, “it is in reason and voluntariness or free will as 
generic features of action that the basis of human dignity is to be found.”295  
 
 .292  GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT, supra note 227, at 94-95. 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  Id. at 168. 
 295.  Id. 
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For the worth assigned to human dignity arises because humans are capable 
of being the authors of their own actions, as well as being moral agents 
capable of controlling their own behavior.  Humans would not have much 
dignity if the state did not afford them the ability to make their own choices.  
Their dignity resides in their autonomy.  Hence, humans properly take 
ownership of their own actions, when their actions are not coerced, and, 
consequently, subject themselves to praise or blame for the choices they 
make. Gewirth describes this relation between dignity and authorship of 
one’s own actions this way: 
 
An ineluctable element of agent-estimated worth, then, is involved 
in the very concept and context of human purposive action.  Now 
there is a direct route from this ascribed worth of the agent’s 
purposes to the worth or dignity of the agent himself.  For he is 
both the general locus of all the particular purposes he wants to 
attain and also the source of his attribution of worth to them.  
Because he is the locus and source, he must hold that the worth he 
attributes to his purposes pertains a fortiori to himself.  They are 
his purposes, and they are worth attaining because he is worth 
sustaining and fulfilling, so that he has what for him is a justified 
sense of his own worth.296 
 
Gewirth goes on to point out that the “worth or dignity the agent 
logically attributes to himself by virtue of the purposiveness of his actions, 
he must also attribute to all other actual or purposive agents.  For their actions 
have the same general kind of purposiveness that provides the ground for his 
attribution of dignity to himself.”297  Consequently, every agent, in 
acknowledging she has rights to freedom and well-being, acknowledges all 
other humans have these same rights.  This imposes “a universalist moral 
restriction on the purposes she is justified in regarding as worth pursuing, 
and, hence, too, on her ascription of worth or dignity to herself.”298  It also 
means that law must be sensitive to this justification and not punish the 
legitimate assertion of human rights.  Yet, nowhere in Gewirth’s analysis 
does he suggest that the actions satisfying human rights or the presence of 
human dignity are the same, or even that the latter is a derivative of the 
former.  Rather, what he suggests is that one’s moral dignity supervenes on 
one’s possession of human rights, along with their willingness to maintain 
 
 296.  GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT, supra note 227, at 169. 
 297.  Id. 
 298.  Id. at 170. 
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rights that are consistent with the rights of others.299  It is this attribution of 
worth that is dialectically necessary, rather than phenomenology required.300  
And it is this attribution of worth that ultimately applies to all human beings, 
such that attempts by anyone, including the state, to undermine or be 
indifferent to it cannot be morally justified.   
Perhaps this is why human dignity has now taken hold in constitutional 
interpretations.  Consider Lawrence v. Texas, a case challenging a Texas 
statute that imposed criminal penalties for private same-sex sexual relations 
of consenting adults with no coercion or overt harm to either party.301  Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, writing for the Majority in striking down the Texas 
statute as unconstitutional, interpreted the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to provide this connection of human dignity to 
constitutional rights: 
 
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter 
upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own 
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.  When 
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another 
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that 
is more enduring.  The liberty protected by the Constitution allows 
homosexual persons the right to make this choice.302 
 
Kennedy would note later in the opinion that “[t]he petitioners are 
entitled to respect for their private lives.”303  Kennedy’s Opinion in this case, 
as well as the Court’s subsequent same-sex marriage decision in Obergefell 
v. Hodges, suggests that efforts to preserve human rights as part of 
constitutional interpretation equate with preserving human dignity at the 
same level; for the constitutional protection of human rights is indeed the 
constitutional protection of each person’s human dignity. 
 
 
 299   THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 891 (Robert Audi ed ., 2nd ed. 1999) 
(“The concept of supervenience, as a relation between properties, is essentially this: Properties of 
type A are supervenient on properties of type B if and only if two objects cannot differ with respect 
to their A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties.”).   
 300  GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT, supra note 227, at 169. 
 301  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 302  Id. at 567. 
 303  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
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Conclusion 
This Article sought to demonstrate that constitutional interpretation 
must proceed on the assumption that the Constitution continues to serve as 
binding higher law cross-generationally only because it continues to be 
acceptable to the public.  Persons who were not alive at the time the 
Constitution was adopted or for several generations thereafter are, therefore, 
critical to the Constitution’s success in remaining authoritative.  If 
constitutional values are not restricted to only what the Framers wrote or 
what they may have expected from what they wrote, that success will likely 
be supported.  Success requires that the tradition the original Constitution 
inaugurated—along with its subsequent amendments and Court 
interpretations—be able to adjust to an ever-changing economic, social, and 
cultural world.  Incorporating new values, as may be necessary to address 
concerns that the Framers did not consider nor could have anticipated, must 
be part of the equation.  At the same time, if there is to be an ongoing single 
constitutional tradition, at least since the adoption of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, it is necessary that any new values or structures are consistent 
with what is already present, even if the new values should alter the level of 
importance previously assigned to those that came before.  Consider what 
happens when a new member is brought into a family by either birth, 
marriage, or adoption.  The new member’s presence certainly alters the 
previous members’ participation insofar as they now, if they are to remain a 
harmonious family, must incorporate the new member into their familial 
relationships.  And the new member, especially when arriving by way of a 
marriage, will find it necessary, if the family is to flourish, to adjust to at 
least some of the traditions already present.  The result will be that family 
obligations will change; some will broaden to include the new member’s 
participation, and others may become a bit more distant as the family grows 
and spreads out both geographically and culturally.  Yet, although it may not 
have the same appearance that would have been recognized by the great-
grandparents or even the grandparents, the family remains.   
A constitutional tradition is like a thriving family.  If it is able to take 
on new challenges, while still maintaining a healthy respect for the past, it 
will thrive; otherwise, it will fail, and a new constitutional tradition will be 
necessary.  More importantly, if it is to remain vital, it must allow for 
changes in the choice of values that are emphasized when circumstances 
require.  Much of this Article has attempted to address this question by 
incorporating a set of human rights values, along with an equally important 
set of conflicts of rights, principles that hopefully would be supportable 
cross-generationally.  The Supreme Court must now determine whether it 
will adopt this approach to constitutional legitimacy, and to the American 
public whether it will make the Constitution succeed or fail. 
